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ABSTRACT 
Not everything is or should be for sale. Collective goods such as our 
democracy and parts of our natural environment would be destroyed if they 
were transformed entirely into commodities to be bought and sold in 
commercial markets. This Article examines a discrete and unexplored topic 
within the larger literature on commodification: the extent to which the U.S. 
Supreme Court participates in the commodification of collective goods. The 
Court shifts market boundaries through its constitutional interpretations 
that glorify commodities and exalt individual rights at the expense of 
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collective goods. Examining two lines of cases holding that “money is 
speech” and “waste is commerce,” this Article contributes a theoretical 
understanding of the nature of collective goods and their commodification 
through constitutional interpretation. It also makes recommendations for 
how the Court and our larger society should address these kinds of issues 
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INTRODUCTION 
Collective goods cannot be bought or sold without destroying their 
essential nature.1 For example, to divide a national park such as Yosemite 
into parcels of real estate would destroy its value as a collective good meant 
for the enjoyment of all citizens in perpetuity. To reduce a political 
 
1. We provide an account of collective goods in Part I. See also JOSEPH RAZ, THE MORALITY 
OF FREEDOM 208 (1986) (defining a group right as a right to a collective good); Jean Hampton, Free-
Rider Problems in the Production of Collective Goods, 3 ECON. & PHIL. 245 (1987) (analyzing a series 
of collective action problems arising in the production and preservation of collective goods); Jeffrey A. 
Hart & Peter F. Cowhey, Theories of Collective Goods Reexamined, 30 W. POL. Q. 351 (1977) 
(reviewing various economic conceptions including those of Mancur Olson and Paul Samuelson); cf. 
LESLIE GREEN, THE AUTHORITY OF THE STATE 207–09 (1988) (“shared goods”); JEREMY WALDRON, 
Can Communal Goods Be Human Rights?, in LIBERAL RIGHTS 339, 339–69 (1993) (“communal 
goods”); Andrei Marmor, Do We Have a Right to Common Goods?, 14 CAN. J.L. & JURIS. 213 (2001) 
(“common goods”); Joseph Raz, Rights and Politics, 71 IND. L.J. 27, 35–36 (1995) (“shared goods”); 
Paul A. Samuelson, The Pure Theory of Public Expenditure, 36 REV. ECON. & STAT. 387, 387–89 (1954) 
(“collective consumption goods”).  











democracy to a regime of purchased loyalties and official actions procured 
only by bribery would corrupt this kind of government. 
This Article contends that the United States Supreme Court has failed in 
some important decisions to give sufficient attention and respect to 
collective goods. Consider, for example, cases that have declared that 
“money is speech”2 and “waste is commerce.”3 The Court’s 
pronouncements in these cases have unjustifiably shifted the boundaries of 
markets, and they have subverted collective goods by converting them into 
commercial commodities. 
The Court accomplishes these transmutations either by treating 
“contested commodities,”4 such as elements of the natural environment, as 
marketable, or by treating existing commodities, like money,5 as worthy of 
the same protection that it extends to non-market constitutional values, like 
speech. In other words, this kind of commodification occurs through judicial 
constitutional determinations about the scope and substance of commercial 
markets.  
In this Article, we uncover, trace, and critique this phenomenon of 
judicial interpretation, which we call constitutional commodification. We 
also suggest remedies to this problem. 
We are not the first to question the lines that are drawn between the world 
of commercial markets, in which everything is “for sale,” and the world of 
non-market interactions and values, in which some things and activities are 
“not for sale.”6 But we focus on two aspects of commodification that have 
gone unnoticed.7 
 
2. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 262 (1976) (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in 
part) (per curiam) (rejecting the Court’s “argument that money is speech”); see also J. Skelly Wright, 
Politics and the Constitution: Is Money Speech?, 85 YALE L.J. 1001, 1005 (1976) (“The Court told us 
[in Buckley v. Valeo], in effect, that money is speech.”); infra Part II. 
3. City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617 (1978), and its progeny; see also Christine 
A. Klein, The Environmental Commerce Clause, 27 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 8 (2003) (noting how “the 
Supreme Court has held that garbage is an article of commerce”); infra Part III. 
4. MARGARET JANE RADIN, CONTESTED COMMODITIES 1–15 (1996) (introducing and 
exploring the concept of “contested commodities”). 
5. Traditionally, money was considered to be a commodity only when it was made from 
material that was itself a commodity (e.g., gold coins) or backed by a commodity valuable in its own 
right (e.g., the gold standard). Today, however, it is standard to understand money (technically “fiat 
money”) as a commodity—indeed even a “pure commodity,” in the sense that it is the measure of value 
for all commodities in commerce. See, e.g., Benjamin Graham, Money as Pure Commodity, 37 AM. 
ECON. REV. 304, 305 (1947); see also GEOFFREY INGHAM, THE NATURE OF MONEY 3–10, 15–37 (2004) 
(conceiving money as a “universal commodity” or a “neutral symbol” of all other commodities).  
6. See, e.g., MICHAEL J. SANDEL, WHAT MONEY CAN’T BUY: THE MORAL LIMITS OF MARKETS 
(2012); DEBRA SATZ, WHY SOME THINGS SHOULD NOT BE FOR SALE: THE MORAL LIMITS OF MARKETS 
3–15 (2010); see also Martha M. Ertman & Joan C. Williams, Preface to RETHINKING 
COMMODIFICATION: CASES AND READINGS IN LAW AND CULTURE 1, 1–7 (Martha M. Ertman & Joan 
C. Williams eds., 2005). 












First, much of the commodification literature contemplates the effects of 
marketization on individuals and the resources and experiences they need 
to live flourishing lives. For example, theorists worry that prostitution 
reifies female subordination8 and degrades sex among intimates.9 Child 
labor, human slavery, and the purchase and sale of vital organs such as 
kidneys provide other illustrations of the pernicious consequences of 
commodification on individuals.10 We share these worries, but we start here 
from the premise that the commodification of collective goods raises 
distinctive concerns, and threatens adverse consequences not only for 
individuals but also for the polity as a whole.  
Collective goods, we maintain, cannot survive subjection to unfettered 
market forces. This is because the commercial market is paradigmatically a 
place for transactions among owners with unilateral dominion over the 
goods and services they sell. Collective goods are intrinsically held in 
common, and so no private person can or should exercise exclusive 
dominion over them. The commodification of collective goods necessarily 
overlooks, and may even betray, the interests of those who are not a party 
to the commercialized transactions. 
A second reason that the commodification of collective goods warrants 
attention is that their marketization has often been facilitated and ratified 
through the courts—the least favorable branch for determining the limits of 
markets. Like the two-party transactions contemplated in much of the 
commodification literature, the Court acts as a proving ground for two 
adversarial parties.11 Protection of collective goods, however, may not 
always be considered adequately in two-party adjudications. Notably, the 
term “collective good” is nowhere to be found in Supreme Court 
jurisprudence,12 and courts have generally been inhospitable to 
 
8. See, e.g., Debra Satz, Markets in Women’s Sexual Labor, 106 ETHICS 63 (1995).  
9. See, e.g., ELIZABETH ANDERSON, VALUE IN ETHICS AND ECONOMICS 154–55 (1993).  
10. See e.g., SATZ, supra note 6, at 155–205. 
11. Cf. Owen M. Fiss, Groups and the Equal Protection Clause, 5 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 107, 127 
(1976) (arguing with respect to the equal protection clause that “it is especially difficult to fit the 
vindication of group rights into the mold of the law suit”). 
12. A Westlaw search of the Supreme Court database turns up zero cases containing the term 
“collective good.” The term “public good” appears in 403 cases, but in these cases the Court is not 
referring to a distinct class of goods but is instead using the term “public good” as a shorthand for “what 
is in the interests of the public,” often in an economic rather than philosophical sense. See, e.g., Kelo v. 
City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 485 n.14 (2005); Murr v. Wisconsin, 137 S. Ct. 1933, 1943 (2017); 
see also infra Part I.B.2 (distinguishing collective goods and public goods). Compare the prevalence of 
the term “efficiency,” which appears in 1,093 Supreme Court cases. 
We do not mean to say that the idea of collective goods does not appear in the reasoning of some 
cases, as we discuss at various places in this Article. Our argument is that the Court should develop a 
better appreciation of collective goods in order to avoid commodifying them inadvertently and without 
the care and caution needed. 











understanding constitutional protections as collective rights.13  
Given the mismatch between collective goods and two-party 
adjudication,14 one might have expected the Court to act cautiously in many 
cases implicating collective goods, recognizing that Congress or state 
legislatures should address their disposition.15 For example, in our 
paradigmatic cases, the Court might have declined to expand the scope of 
constitutional protection for money when used for political speech, or 
declined to restrict the authority of the states to protect land when used as 
waste dumps.16 If anything, though, the Court has often taken the lead in 
cases widening the scope of commercial markets. It has commodified 
objects or activities whose value may be better captured non-monetarily, 
and it has elevated paradigmatic commodities such as money to 
constitutional status, and thereby insulated them from regulation motivated 
and informed by non-economic collective values.17  
More formally, as we show here, the Court engages in what we call 
constitutional commodification, a process of interpreting the Constitution in 
two different but complementary directions. First, the Court sometimes 
assimilates a commodity (e.g., money) to a genuine constitutional good 
(e.g., speech). We call this the constitutionalization of a commodity,18 and 
we elaborate it primarily through the line of cases, beginning with Buckley 
v. Valeo,19 that equate money and political speech.20  
 
13. See, e.g., Jeffrey M. Blum, The Divisible First Amendment: A Critical Functionalist 
Approach to Freedom of Speech and Electoral Campaign Spending, 58 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1273, 1282 
(1983) (arguing that a “libertarian conception of first amendment principle has become popular not by 
force of reason, but by default”); see also infra notes 122–128 and accompanying text. But see Red Lion 
Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969) (discussing the sense in which citizens have a “collective 
right” in freedom of speech). For the view that the Court’s focus on individual rights occludes “civic[] 
and collective responsibilities,” see MARY ANN GLENDON, RIGHTS TALK: THE IMPOVERISHMENT OF 
POLITICAL DISCOURSE x–xi (1991).  
14. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1; Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992) 
(standing requires an “injury in fact” that is “concrete and particularized” and can be redressed by 
judicial decision).  
15. Another alternative, which often occurs at least in the Supreme Court, is for a representative 
of the government or a third-party organization representing a collective good or value to intervene in a 
case or offer a broader social perspective via amicus curiae briefs. These third-party contributions should 
often give the Court the opportunity to consider broader implications involving collective goods in their 
deliberations. 
This consideration of collective goods suggests also that courts should defer to executive or 
independent administrative agencies when they act to protect them. Without making the argument at 
length here, we suggest that social decisions, generally speaking, to commodify what has previously 
been treated as a collective good should usually fall to democratically elected legislatures rather than the 
judicial branch. 
16. See infra Parts II & III. 
17. See infra Parts II & III. 
18. For background on treating money as a commodity, see supra note 5. 
19. 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam).  












Second, the Court sometimes treats collective goods as commodities 
whose value may be better captured non-monetarily. For example, 
beginning with City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey,21 waste has been 
constitutionally determined to be “in commerce” rather than a 
noncommercial byproduct that would make it eligible for comprehensive 
environmental regulation by the states.22 In these cases, a commercial 
interest in a collective good not otherwise obviously or previously treated 
as a commodity gains protection through interpretation of a constitutional 
provision. We refer to this interpretive approach as commodification by 
constitutional implication. When the Court treats a collective good like any 
other item in commerce, it immunizes economic transactions involving this 
newly constitutionally protected commerce from certain kinds of regulation.  
Although we believe in the significant social value of commercial 
markets, we raise a warning about constitutional commodification because 
it threatens essential collective non-commercial values—in our two leading 
examples, the value of democratic government and the value of an 
unpolluted natural environment. We use these examples to explicate a 
theory of constitutional commodification with an eye toward the 
preservation of these collective goods. 
In short, this Article offers two theoretical innovations. First, it extends 
commodification theory in order to elucidate when and why the law’s 
treatment of collective goods risks problematic commodification. Second, 
our examination of constitutional commodification represents a theoretical 
contribution in its own right. Identifying the interpretive mechanisms 
through which the Court shifts market boundaries reveals why these 
developments are troubling both as a matter of substantive policy and 
institutional prerogative. 
Our Article proceeds as follows. Part I briefly outlines the historical and 
philosophical literature on commodification. We argue that the existing 
theories do not track the harms that can befall collective goods when their 
constituent elements are commodified. We extend commodification theory 
to address collective goods. 
Parts II and III provide case studies that exemplify constitutional 
commodification. Part II reviews the line of cases that chart the Court’s 
recent march to an increasingly commodified conception of political speech 
and an ever greater insistence that any money spent on political speech 
deserves the same protection as political speech itself.  
Part III considers a different line of cases decided under the negative or 
“dormant” Commerce Clause23 that have restricted states from adopting 
 
21. 437 U.S. 617 (1978).  
22. See infra Part III. 
23. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 











various measures to protect their natural environment from the importation 
and disposal of solid and hazardous waste. We show that the Court has 
wielded the Commerce Clause in these cases to protect an emergent 
interstate market in waste disposal at the expense of the traditional 
prerogatives and constitutional jurisdiction of state governments. 
We conclude by identifying further areas of application of our account, 
and begin the process of recommending possible institutional responses to 
protect and preserve collective goods.  
I. A THEORY OF THE COMMODIFICATION OF COLLECTIVE GOODS 
In this Part, we consider historical and philosophical accounts of 
commodification to establish that they cannot track the unique harms arising 
from commodifying collective goods. We supplement these accounts and 
then examine how these theoretical discussions map onto the landscape of 
constitutional law. 
A. Commodification in Historical Perspective 
Commodification on a grand scale has been part of the historical process 
moving society from the pre-industrial to the industrial age and beyond. 
Modern capitalism arose from what the economic historian and social 
theorist Karl Polanyi called “a great transformation.”24 This included a 
foundational shift in treating land and labor as commercial commodities, 
namely as real estate and employment. Prior to this transformation, in feudal 
societies in Europe and elsewhere, these relationships were subjected more 
often to a political economy of “status” (e.g., systems of lords and serfs) 
rather than purchase and sale through commercial “contracts.”25  
The rise of business enterprises and the institutional markets supporting 
them produced compelling social pressures for change, resulting in what 
Polanyi called a “double movement” of expanding commodification 
(including of land and labor) and reactive regulation (including land use and 
 
24. KARL POLANYI, THE GREAT TRANSFORMATION: THE POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC ORIGINS 
OF OUR TIME 71–80 (Beacon Press 2d ed. 2001) (1944); see also MARK BLYTH, GREAT 
TRANSFORMATIONS: ECONOMIC IDEAS AND INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 3–
16 (2002) (revisiting and updating Polanyi’s historical analysis).  
25. See HENRY SUMNER MAINE, ANCIENT LAW: ITS CONNECTION WITH THE EARLY HISTORY OF 
SOCIETY AND ITS RELATION TO MODERN IDEAS 165 (Beacon Paperback 1963) (1861) (noting a general 
evolution from “status” to “contract”); see also Manfred Rehbinder, Status, Contract, and the Welfare 
State, 23 STAN. L. REV. 941 (1971) (critically examining the concepts of “status” and “contract” in terms 
of the changing of roles of individuals and law in modern society); Aviam Soifer, Status, Contract, and 
Promises Unkept, 96 YALE L.J. 1916 (1987) (discussing the concept of “status” and “contract” in the 













employment laws).26 This kind of “double movement” continues today as 
new areas of life become commodified, such as with the rise of the so-called 
gig economy, and regulatory responses, either through attempts to suppress 
the likes of Uber and Airbnb by established taxi and hotel companies or the 
adoption of new regulations that legitimate the new business and market 
practices.27 The general expansion of global markets and the potential for 
“backlash” against this expansion can also be understood in terms of a 
Polanyian “double movement” of market expansion and responsive 
regulation.28 
Take, for example, the problem of air pollution. Most environmental 
economists argue in favor of either cap-and-trade regimes or taxes that 
amount to the “commodification of pollution.”29 These regulatory 
approaches create markets designed to have positive outcomes, namely the 
reduction of various kinds of pollution, such as sulfur dioxide which causes 
acid rain, in a manner that minimizes the costs.30 Others object that to sell 
“rights to pollute” is an immoral extension of economic markets—the 
equivalent to selling indulgences in medieval Europe as an amelioration of 
 
26. POLANYI, supra note 24, at 79–80; see also BLYTH, supra note 24, at 1–7, 274–75 (extending 
Polanyi’s account of the “double movement” to contemporary political issues). 
27. See, e.g., Martin Kenney & John Zysman, The Rise of the Platform Economy, ISSUES SCI. & 
TECH., Spring 2016, at 61; see also Erez Aloni, Pluralizing the “Sharing” Economy, 91 WASH. L. REV. 
1397 (2016); Orly Lobel, The Law of the Platform, 101 MINN. L. REV. 87 (2016); Frank Pasquale, Essay, 
Two Narratives of Platform Capitalism, 35 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 309 (2016); Kellen Zale, Sharing 
Property, 87 U. COLO. L. REV. 501 (2016).  
28. See, e.g., Brian Burgoon, Globalization and Backlash: Polanyi’s Revenge?, 16 REV. INT’L 
POL. ECON. 145 (2009). Organizational, economic, and technological changes can also render previous 
regulatory responses ineffective, demanding new approaches and innovations. See Ryan Calo & Alex 
Rosenblat, Essay, The Taking Economy: Uber, Information, and Power, 117 COLUM. L. REV. 1623 
(2017); Nicolas Colin & Bruno Palier, The Next Safety Net: Social Policy for a Digital Age, FOREIGN 
AFF., July/Aug. 2015, at 29. The decline of unions and the increasing irrelevance of major labor 
legislation in the United States provides an example. See Kate Andrias, The New Labor Law, 126 YALE 
L.J. 2 (2016). 
29. See, e.g., Partha Dasgupta, The Environment as a Commodity, in ECONOMIC POLICY 
TOWARDS THE ENVIRONMENT 25, 25–39 (Dieter Helm ed., 1991); see also Jonathan Remy Nash & 
Richard L. Revesz, Markets and Geography: Designing Marketable Permit Schemes to Control Local 
and Regional Pollutants, 28 ECOLOGY L.Q. 569, 571 (2001) (providing an overview and assessment of 
various regulatory methods of “establishing markets in pollution rights”). The most recent innovation is 
a carbon fee and dividend approach, a version of which has been introduced in Congress. See Senators 
Coons and Feinstein Introduce Climate Action Rebate Act of 2019, EDF (July 25, 2019), https://www.ed 
f.org/media/senators-coons-and-feinstein-introduce-climate-action-rebate-act-2019 [https://perma.cc/Y 
767-S7U7].  
30. The acid rain trading scheme, for example, adopted in the United States under the leadership 
of President George H.W. Bush is generally regarded as a success story. See, e.g., Daniel C. Esty, 
Environmental Protection in the Information Age, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 115, 188 (2004); see also infra 
note 220 and accompanying text; cf. Christopher H. Schroeder, Prophets, Priests, and Pragmatists, 87 
MINN. L. REV. 1065, 1090 (2003) (describing the acid rain trading program as a “success story,” but one 
that should not be overdrawn). But see Jody Freeman & Daniel A. Farber, Modular Environmental 
Regulation, 54 DUKE L.J. 795, 814–16 (2005) (arguing that the acid rain trading program has a “mixed” 
record of success).  











bad behavior. Pope Francis and others have adopted this critical attitude.31 
The fact that policymakers and commentators disagree about whether to 
address particular problems through market expansion underscores the 
controversial nature of commodification, and the importance of determining 
which institutional actors are best suited to make these policy decisions. 
B. Commodification and Collective Goods 
The contemporary literature critical of commodification adduces three 
kinds of harms. First, market transactions unfolding against background 
circumstances of injustice can undermine our individual status as equals.32 
For example, economic desperation can make some people susceptible to 
exploitation by others, and that exploitation can prompt others to 
commodify themselves—e.g., by selling vital organs.33 Second, distributing 
some resources, such as emergency healthcare, only according to one’s 
ability to pay can lead to intolerable inequality.34 Third, transacting in 
contested commodities can adversely affect our conception or valuation of 
individuals who bear a relationship to those commodities, such as in selling 
sex as a service, by creating a “domino effect.”35  
None of these accounts of the harms of commodification, however, can 
adequately capture what is uniquely problematic about the commodification 
of collective goods. The first two—status diminishment and material 
inequality—are straightforwardly harms that affect individual market 
participants. The domino effect contemplates commodification’s 
consequences for those beyond the two parties to a transaction, but the 
consequences are nonetheless noteworthy because of the ways they affect 
individuals. On this account, for example, prostitution is problematic not 
only because it degrades sex and objectifies the prostitute, but also because 
 
31. POPE FRANCIS, LAUDATO SI’: ON CARE FOR OUR COMMON HOME (2015) (encyclical letter); 
see also RICHARD J. LAZARUS, THE MAKING OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 183 (2004) (“Some 
environmentalists question[] the morality of creating tradeable ‘property rights to pollute’ at all.”); 
SANDEL, supra note 6, at 72–79 (expressing moral reservations about pollution trading regimes such as 
those proposed for climate change regulation). 
32. See SATZ, supra note 6, at 93–97 (identifying the harm of commodification in terms of 
exploitation or coercion).  
33. See, e.g., Stephen J. Choi, Mitu Gulati & Eric A. Posner, Altruism Exchanges and the Kidney 
Shortage, 77 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 3, 2014, at 289, 292 (noting that kidney transplant policy 
favors kidney donations since concerns about exploitation and commodification do not arise where the 
donor has altruistic motivations). 
34. See MICHAEL WALZER, SPHERES OF JUSTICE 25–26 (1983) (arguing for “need” as one 
distributive principle of justice); Richard Schragger, Consuming Government, 101 MICH. L. REV. 1824, 
1835 (2003) (“[C]ertain basic public goods like education, environmental quality, sanitation, housing, 
and policing should be provided on a relatively equal basis regardless of individuals’ private resources. 
The normative intuition that it is unjust to distribute public services based on ability to pay animates the 
fair housing, school funding equalization, and environmental justice movements.”).  












it perpetuates a conception of all people as objects of use for sex, women 
especially.36 These are troubling consequences, but they all concern the 
impact of prostitution on individuals. 
The problem of commodifying collective goods cannot be captured in 
these conceptual frameworks. The commodification of collective goods 
does not undermine the status of the parties to the transactions, and it does 
not obviously degrade the transacted goods. Commodifying collective 
goods threatens harm to others, but the interests it harms are in the first 
instance socially shared, not individually owned.  
We turn now to articulating a theory that will better explain the troubling 
effects of the commodification of collective goods.  
1. Market Individualism and Commodification 
The commercial market, or at least the ideal commercial market, is a 
place of economic exchange between two parties, whether individual 
persons or organizations. The nature of markets presupposes a set of norms 
consonant with individual ownership.37  
First, commercial markets are normatively neutral as between 
individuals’ preferences for the kinds of things anyone buys or sells, in what 
quantities, at what prices, and for what ends. Consumerism entails that we 
turn to the market for purposes of satisfying our wants and needs, amassing 
and then preserving or consuming the commodities we acquire as we see 
 
36. Deborah Satz and Elizabeth Anderson resolutely argue that prostitution disproportionately 
and uniquely harms women. See ANDERSON, supra note 9; Satz, supra note 8, at 76–78, 85. Others note 
the rising trend of women buying men for sex too, and the objectification of all people that might result. 
See, e.g., Carol M. Rose, Afterword: Whither Commodification?, in RETHINKING COMMODIFICATION, 
supra note 6, at 402, 406 (observing that we live in a “second-best world” in which “sexual services are 
in fact bought and sold,” and “[e]ven women have started to buy them from men, apparently rather 
gleefully”). But see Ann Lucas, The Currency of Sex: Prostitution, Law, and Commodification, in 
RETHINKING COMMODIFICATION, supra note 6, at 248, 254 (arguing that “commodified sexual pleasure 
[may] represent an advance over noncommodified nonpleasure”). 
One might also argue that legalized prostitution affects collective goods of families and marriages. 
Cf. Dirk Bethmann & Michael Kvasnicka, The Institution of Marriage, 24 J. POPULATION ECON. 1005 
(2011) (providing an economic argument for marriage based on assurances of male paternity). But cf. 
Melissa Murray, Marriage as Punishment, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (2012) (describing marriage as an 
institution used primarily for disciplining women). Commodification of sex may therefore give rise to 
significant general concerns for children’s welfare and public health. Even in these cases, however, the 
consequences amount to an aggregation of harm to individuals and not “collective goods” in the sense 
that we are using the term here. Few would argue that sex itself is somehow a “collective good.”  
37. Property and trade are therefore prerequisites of markets, and markets are subject to “the 
rules of the game” of property ownership and trade that legal regimes establish. Note also that 
organizational persons created by law, such as nation-states and business enterprises, may also transact 
as “persons” in markets. See generally ERIC W. ORTS, BUSINESS PERSONS: A LEGAL THEORY OF THE 
FIRM (rev. ed. 2015). 











fit.38 To treat something as an object of consumption is to conceive of its 
value mostly in instrumental terms.39 Take, for example, our attitude toward 
breakfast cereals. Their value lies in the nutritional benefits and gustatory 
enjoyment they provide to us as individuals.  
Our orientation toward market goods is also usually atomistic. Absent a 
food shortage, no one has any ground to complain about the quantity of 
cereal any one person acquires or consumes. We enter and operate in this 
market as private citizens, concerned to satisfy our own interests and 
desires, whatever these may happen to be.40 The market itself makes us 
beholden to no one with respect to our choices, though obligations incurred 
elsewhere—in the home, in the workplace, through friendships, civic ties, 
and so on—may operate as extrinsic constraints on our market activity. Put 
differently, a paradigmatically commodified good is one over which its 
owner’s dominion is complete. An owner might choose to alienate, or 
“unbundle,” one or more of the entitlements to which ownership gives rise, 
but the owner is the ultimate authority over the good’s disposition.41  
Atomism and consumerism both sustain and follow from what has been 
called the coarseness of commercial markets.42 We do not typically turn to 
these markets for social solidarity or spiritual uplift; still less do we conceive 
 
38. See LIZABETH COHEN, A CONSUMERS’ REPUBLIC: THE POLITICS OF MASS CONSUMPTION IN 
POSTWAR AMERICA (2003) (providing a historical account of the rise of consumer interests in the United 
States).  
39. Although objects with intrinsic value might enter the stream of commerce at some point in 
their existence, what distinguishes them from commodities is, precisely, that they are not goods for 
consumption. Thus, no one denies or decries the fact that great works of art are bought and sold. We 
allow for their commodification to this extent—but only to this extent. Cf. RADIN, supra note 4, at 102–
20 (describing a relationship to commodities with intrinsic value as “incomplete commodification”). 
40. See, e.g., ANDERSON, supra note 9, at 146.  
41. See, e.g., Anna di Robilant & Talha Syed, The Fundamental Building Blocks of Social 
Relations Regarding Resources: Hohfeld in Europe and Beyond, in THE LEGACY OF WESLEY HOHFELD: 
EDITED MAJOR WORKS, SELECT PERSONAL PAPERS, AND ORIGINAL COMMENTARIES (Shyam 
Balganesh, Ted Sichelman & Henry Smith eds., forthcoming 2019); see generally Wesley Newcomb 
Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning, 26 YALE L.J. 710 (1917) 
(offering a systematic analysis of the normative relations individuals bear to one another, including those 
that arise with respect to particular goods); Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal 
Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning, 23 YALE L.J. 16 (1913) (same). 
42. See, e.g., ALBERT O. HIRSCHMAN, RIVAL VIEWS OF MARKET SOCIETY 105–39 (1986) 
(contrasting the idea of "doux commerce," which posits that increases in market activity promote a 
peaceful society and better manners, with the "self-destruction thesis," which argues that the pursuit of 
self-interest depletes the moral foundations of society by discouraging cooperation); Lewis Friedland et 
al., The Politics of Consumption/The Consumption of Politics, 611 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. 
SCI. 6, 9 (2007) (aligning coarseness with an individual orientation); Julia D. Mahoney, The Market for 
Human Tissue, 86 VA. L. REV. 163, 205 (2000) (“The market has been lauded as a promoter of peace 
and progress and derided as a coarsening influence, one that encourages its participants to value financial 
returns at the expense of community and spirit.”); cf. J. G. A. POCOCK, The Mobility of Property and the 
Rise of Eighteenth-Century Sociology, in VIRTUE, COMMERCE, AND HISTORY: ESSAYS ON POLITICAL 
THOUGHT AND HISTORY, CHIEFLY IN THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY 103, 104 (1985) (“In every phase of 
Western tradition, there is a conception of virtue . . . to which the spread of exchange relations is seen 












of market activity as an end in itself. The market is where we do our 
business, in both the literal and colloquial senses of the word. It is a site for 
satisfying some further set of ends, so we do not need or expect it to be 
morally elevating or fulfilling in its own right.43 Commercial markets are 
not, then, the place to determine entitlements to collective goods that 
deserve more solicitous treatment than the market can confer, and whose 
disposition should not be governed by the norms of atomism and 
consumerism characteristic of market activity. The market, that is, should 
not determine whether collective goods should be commodified. 
2. Commodification of Collective Goods  
The collective goods most familiar to us are public goods, and so we 
begin our analysis with them. In the economics literature, public goods are 
not considered commodities because no one person can claim exclusive 
dominion over them. Instead, public goods are, by definition, non-
excludable and non-rivalrous.44 Fireworks displays in municipal parks, for 
example, are public goods because it is practically impossible to limit access 
to them (hence they are non-excludable), and enjoyment of them is not 
diminished by their being shared by others (hence they are non-rival). 
Natural resources, such as a lake used for swimming or a forest used for 
hiking, qualify as public goods for the same reason.45  
 
43. Cf. Shirley Woodward, Debt to Society: A Communitarian Approach to Criminal Antiprofit 
Laws, 85 GEO. L.J. 455, 486 (1997) (“The market is an amoral venue that provides rewards and 
incentives independently of the moral worth of the activity involved.”). 
44. See, e.g., Paul A. Samuelson, The Pure Theory of Public Expenditure, 36 REV. ECON. & 
STAT. 387, 387–89 (1954) (identifying these two characteristics); William D. Nordhaus, Paul Samuelson 
and Global Public Goods, in SAMUELSONIAN ECONOMICS AND THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 88, 89 
(Michael Szenberg et al. eds., 2006) (crediting Samuelson for the insight); see also Tyler Cowen, 
Introduction to PUBLIC GOODS AND MARKET FAILURES: A CRITICAL EXAMINATION 1, 3 (Tyler Cowen 
ed., 1992) (using similar terminology); Tyler Cowen, Public Goods, LIBR. ECON. & HIST., http://www.ec 
onlib.org/library/Enc/PublicGoods.html [https://perma.cc/2KAD-EMPF] (“[N]onexcludability is 
usually considered the more important of the two aspects of public goods.”). But see Harold Demsetz, 
The Private Production of Public Goods, 13 J.L. & ECON. 293, 295 (1970) (noting a key feature of a 
public good is that “it is possible at no cost for additional persons to enjoy the same unit of a public 
good.”).  
45. See WILLIAM D. NORDHAUS, MANAGING THE GLOBAL COMMONS: THE ECONOMICS OF 
CLIMATE CHANGE 3 (1994) (analyzing elements of the natural environment as global public goods). Of 
course, the fact that it is possible for everyone to enjoy a public good in perpetuity does not entail that 
everyone’s use will in fact preserve it in perpetuity: hence, the tragedy of the commons. Garrett Hardin, 
The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCI. 1243, 1244 (1968); see also ELINOR OSTROM, GOVERNING THE 
COMMONS: THE EVOLUTION OF INSTITUTIONS FOR COLLECTIVE ACTION (1990) (correcting and 
updating Hardin’s approach); Stephen M. Gardiner, The Real Tragedy of the Commons, 30 PHIL. & PUB. 
AFF. 387 (2001) (same). 











Much of the economics literature is agnostic about the intrinsic value of 
public goods.46 Thus the Grand Canyon47 and bald eagles48 might be taken 
to be public goods, but so too might municipal waste collection49 and 
national defense.50 From this perspective, the defining feature of public 
goods is that they do not readily yield the incidents of private ownership. 
Because they are non-rivalrous and non-excludable, it is not possible for 
any one person to internalize fully whatever value they hold, and so no one 
has an incentive to seek to control, manage, or protect them.51 It is for this 
reason that the disposition of public goods falls to the government,52 and 
partly for this reason that nation-states exist.53 Or so the standard economic 
story goes.54 
This story is incomplete, however. It assumes that, if only one could limit 
access and charge a fee for use, public goods would be fair game in the 
marketplace (as some economists apparently believe all goods and services 
should be).55 By contrast, from a non-economic perspective, the fact that 
some goods are public might enhance rather than detract from their value, 
because the use or enjoyment of a public good might be constituted in part 
 
46. See, e.g., Gary North, The Fallacy of “Intrinsic Value,” FOUND. FOR ECON. EDUC. (June 1, 
1969), https://fee.org/articles/the-fallacy-of-intrinsic-value/ [https://perma.cc/QMB8-YSY7] (quoting 
what the author takes to be the words of J. Enoch Powell: “If people value something, it has value; if 
people do not value something, it does not have value; and there is no intrinsic about it.”). 
47. See, e.g., ROBERT SERRANO & ALLAN M. FELDMAN, A SHORT COURSE IN INTERMEDIATE 
MICROECONOMICS WITH CALCULUS 353 (2d ed. 2018). 
48. See, e.g., BARRY C. FIELD, NATURAL RESOURCE ECONOMICS: AN INTRODUCTION 48 (2d ed. 
2008). 
49. See, e.g., George Klosko, The Natural Basis of Political Obligation, in NATURAL LAW AND 
MODERN MORAL PHILOSOPHY 93, 103 (Ellen Frankel Paul, Fred D. Miller, Jr. & Jeffrey Paul eds., 
2001). 
50. David Schmidtz, Contracts and Public Goods, 10 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 475, 475 (1987) 
(“Many economists and political philosophers answer that national defense is a public good.”).  
51. This is, of course, a restatement of “the tragedy of the commons.” See supra note 45.  
52. See, e.g., Joseph Heath, Three Normative Models of the Welfare State, PUB. REASON, Dec. 
2011, at 13, 26–28. 
53. See PAUL D. MILLER, ARMED STATE BUILDING: CONFRONTING STATE FAILURE, 1898–2012, 
at 44 (2013) (“The performance of functions and provision of public goods is how a state enacts its claim 
to legitimacy . . . .”). 
54. See, e.g., MANCUR OLSON, JR., THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION 1–2 (1965). But see Dan 
M. Kahan, The Logic of Reciprocity: Trust, Collective Action, and Law, 102 MICH. L. REV. 71, 71 (2003) 
(“[A]s a wealth of social science evidence now makes clear, Olson's Logic is false. In collective-action 
settings, individuals adopt not a materially calculating posture but rather a richer, more emotionally 
nuanced reciprocal one.”). 
55. See, e.g., Elisabeth M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Economics of the Baby Shortage, 7 
J. LEGAL STUD. 323, 324, 348 (1978) (assuming that anything that can be bought and sold will and 
should be bought and sold). These features are salient to economists because they explain why collective 
goods are “market failures.” See ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS 45–49 
(1988); Francis M. Bator, The Anatomy of Market Failure, in THE THEORY OF MARKET FAILURE 35, 55 












by its public nature.56 For example, the pleasures one takes in a cultural 
event, such as a community baseball game or a public concert, may be 
heightened by—indeed may even depend on57—one’s sharing the 
experience with others. At this deeper conceptual level, most contemporary 
economists miss the irreducibly collective nature of the value of public 
goods due to a pre-commitment to methodological individualism, namely 
the view that the proper unit of analysis is always the individual.58 
More specifically, the economics literature tends to focus on the 
experience of the individual qua end-user of the public good instead of the 
individual qua participant in the production, preservation, transmission, use, 
enjoyment, and benefit of the public good. This focus is consonant with the 
consumerist and atomistic market norms discussed above.59 A more 
encompassing view of goods like baseball games would recognize that they 
are not merely goods that individuals enjoy alongside one another (an 
individualist view). At least some such goods are those to which individuals 
contribute together in a collective fashion (a collectivist view).60 By 
cheering at the baseball game or rock concert, for example, we together, 
collectively, make the event what it is. It is the raucous, infectious, 
exhilarating, and shared nature of the experience that distinguishes watching 
the game or concert live from watching it in the confines of one’s home 
alone. We are a part of the event inasmuch as the players or musicians feed 
off our energy, but also inasmuch as we feed off one another’s energy. This 
is why watching our team’s “away” game on the Jumbotron in our home 
stadium is a communal event even though the team cannot hear or see us, 
and so cannot benefit from the live cheering of its fans.61  
 
56. A note about taxonomy: We do not insist on a sharp distinction between public and collective 
goods, though we are inclined to use the term “public good” when referring to the kinds of goods 
economists have in mind—e.g., vaccination programs or fireworks displays—and collective goods 
where we are contemplating goods whose value is constituted in part by their being shared—e.g., a rock 
concert or self-government in a democratic republic. For a more pointed distinction between the two, 
see Waheed Hussain, The Common Good, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL. ARCHIVE (Feb. 26, 2018), https:/ 
/plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2018/entries/common-good/ [https://perma.cc/AU5U-N3G2]. 
57. Cf. Denise Réaume, Individuals, Groups, and Rights to Public Goods, 38 U. TORONTO L.J. 
1, 11 (1988). 
58. See, e.g., LARS UDEHN, METHODOLOGICAL INDIVIDUALISM: BACKGROUND, HISTORY AND 
MEANING (2001) (collecting and discussing a variety of theories of individualism); Kenneth J. Arrow, 
Methodological Individualism and Social Knowledge, 84 AM. ECON. REV. (PAPERS & PROC.) 1, 1 
(1994); Geoff Hodgson, Behind Methodological Individualism, 10 CAMBRIDGE J. ECON. 211 (1986).  
59. See supra Part I.B.1. 
60. Cf. Arrow, supra note 58, at 8 (concluding that “social variables, not attached to particular 
individuals, are essential in studying the economy or any other social system”). 
61. Note that the nature of a public good may also require restriction of the number of individuals 
that use it. For example, the value of wilderness or a natural setting sufficient to support a rich 
biodiversity of plants and animals may depend on restricting access to only a certain number of people 
at one time (such as through permits for excursions into a national park) in order to preserve the public 
good for the use and enjoyment of present and future generations. We thank Shontee Pant for suggesting 
this conceptual extension. 











The element of joint production can, but need not, be constitutive of the 
value of collective goods. Indeed, the two contested commodities of central 
interest here—collective self-government and elements of the natural 
environment—require our contribution to their maintenance and 
preservation, but our enjoyment of them does not necessarily depend on 
their being enjoyed by others too. For example, part of the pleasure of a 
public park might come from the opportunities it affords to see and be seen, 
both of which require others to participate and observe too.62 Other 
environmental goods are best enjoyed in the company of just a few others, 
or even alone.63 In a similar vein, civic republicans describe collective self-
government in the way that we have described attendance at rock concerts: 
as both an enjoyable and virtuous pursuit, and a pursuit whose joys and 
virtues are partly constituted by their communal or collective aspects.64 
Even a less exuberant view of democratic government recognizes it as a 
public project, in the sense that our government belongs to us collectively 
and acts for us in a collectively organized manner.65  
It is this social aspect of collective goods that makes plain just how 
unsuitable the consumerist and atomistic orientations are to their 
dispositions. Consumerism and atomism entail unilateral decision-making 
by each individual person, with self-regard, self-interest, and self-defined 
preferences as their primary guide.66 By contrast, and very broadly 
 
62. This is captured, for example, in Georges Seurat’s masterpiece, A Sunday on La Grande 
Jatte—1884, ART INST. OF CHI., https://www.artic.edu/artworks/27992/a-sunday-on-la-grande-jatte-18 
84 [https://perma.cc/WWE6-EFAC].  
63. See, e.g., HENRY DAVID THOREAU, WALDEN; OR, LIFE IN THE WOODS (1854).  
64. See, e.g., HANNAH ARENDT, What Is Freedom?, in BETWEEN PAST AND FUTURE: EIGHT 
EXERCISES IN POLITICAL THOUGHT 143, 154–55 (Viking Press 2d ed. 1968) (arguing that political 
participation is constitutive of the good life). 
65. Lawrence Lessig, channeling Robert Post, offers an encomium to collective self-government 
that captures this thought:  
In [the domain of democracy], I, and others, collectively determine what our governments will 
be, and to some extent, what our communities will be. Here is the place where collective, and 
reflective, judgment is to occur, not at the level of an individual's life, but at the level of a 
collective. Here is where the rules get made, through a process of collective judgment about 
what the rules ought to be. The domain of democracy is the place where one is critical, where 
one steps outside of a particular life, or of a particular community, into a life set upon thinking 
reflectively about how we should live. 
Lawrence Lessig, Post Constitutionalism, 94 MICH. L. REV. 1422, 1427 (1996) (book review) 
(summarizing Post’s view); see also ROBERT C. POST, CONSTITUTIONAL DOMAINS: DEMOCRACY, 
COMMUNITY, MANAGEMENT 80 (1995); cf. Robert C. Post, Viewpoint Discrimination and Commercial 
Speech, 41 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 169, 175–76 (2007) (asserting that “democracy is not about individual 
self-government, but about collective self-determination”); Owen M. Fiss, Essay, Free Speech and 
Social Structure, 71 IOWA L. REV. 1405, 1411 (1986) (arguing that free speech doctrine should focus 
not on protecting autonomy but instead on “enrich[ing] public debate”). 
66. This is not to say that individual persons—including organizational persons—cannot and do 
not make moral determinations and set moral limits (or preferences) for themselves when acting in 













speaking, collective goods require collective governance by the citizens to 
whom those goods belong. We jointly preserve, protect, produce, maintain, 
regulate, oversee, and support these collective goods. We adopt an attitude 
of stewardship toward them. 
Further, it is by virtue of their common ownership that these goods 
deserve more thoughtful and respectful treatment than commercial markets 
can provide. The market’s coarseness encourages moral indifference to the 
transactions there.67 We cannot afford, however, to be morally indifferent 
to the disposition of at least some collective goods. This is why endangered 
species, for example, are prohibited from being bought and sold, and indeed 
may not be exchanged in any way that would inure to the financial benefit 
of their purveyor.68 National parks and national symbols receive the same 
hallowed treatment.69 Once we recognize the special protection from market 
forces that collective goods require, we can appreciate why constitutional 
commodification can be wrong.  
C. Constitutional Commodification in the Supreme Court 
Commodification occurs through social, political, and legal decisions 
about the structure and scope of commercial markets. In the history of the 
expansion of labor markets at the dawn of the Industrial Revolution in 
England, for example, a combination of the repeal of legal protections for 
former serfs and an enclosure movement converting open fields to fenced-
in or hedged arable land forced people into labor markets.70 Ever since, 
 
individual participants acting in their own self-interest. See ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE 
NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 18 (Edwin Cannan ed., 1976) (1776) (“It is not from 
the benevolence of the butcher, the brewer, or the baker, that we expect our dinner, but from their regard 
to their own interest. We address ourselves, not to their humanity but to their self-love, and never talk 
to them of our own necessities but of their advantages.”).  
67. See supra text accompanying notes 38–43.  
68. Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1538 (2018). “The American bald eagle,” as one of us 
recently opined in response to an attempt to reduce protection of endangered species, “is not for sale. 
The Endangered Species Act forbids a cost-benefit analysis of how much economic gain justifies the 
eradication of a species.” Eric W. Orts, Letter to the Editor, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 14, 2019, at A22.  
69. See, e.g., U.S. Trademark Act of 1946 (Lanham Act) § 2(b), 15 U.S.C. § 1052(b) (2018) 
(barring the registration of marks that consist of or comprise the “the flag or coat of arms or other insignia 
of the United States . . . or any simulation thereof”); see also Barry Werbin, Protection of Government 
Symbols in the United States, INTA BULL. (Feb. 15, 2008), https://www.inta.org/INTABulletin/Pages/Pr 
otectionofGovernmentSymbolsintheUnitedStates.aspx [https://perma.cc/5BQH-6SZS] (describing a 
cease and desist letter that the George W. Bush administration sent to The Onion because the newspaper 
allegedly violated the “statutory prohibition on use of the seal for commercial purposes”).  
70. See POLANYI, supra note 24, at 36–37, 75–79, 81–107. As Polanyi notes, this was not a 
benign process: “Enclosures have appropriately been called a revolution of the rich against the poor. The 
lords and nobles . . . were literally robbing the poor of their share in the [previously] common [land], 
tearing down the houses which, by the hitherto unbreakable force of custom, the poor had long regarded 
as theirs . . . .” Id. at 37. Polanyi agrees, though, that “[i]n the end the free labor market, in spite of the 
inhuman methods employed in creating it, proved financially beneficial to all concerned.” Id. at 81; see 
also supra Part I.A. 











questions have arisen concerning what human activities and which parts of 
the natural environment should become subject to expanding markets, and 
which should not. These questions have sparked the “double movement” in 
the legal treatment of various commodifications as described by Karl 
Polanyi, and spawned a growing academic literature on commodification.71  
Our interest here, however, does not primarily concern the general 
political and philosophical question of what should be commodified or not. 
Instead, we focus on the particular role that the Supreme Court has played 
in recent years in what we diagnose as constitutional commodification.72 
In our view, the Court has not been sufficiently attentive to the special 
nature of collective goods. Instead, it has at times—especially recently73—
operated with an apparent fervor favoring market freedom and expansion 
over other considerations. In so doing, it has subjected the value of some our 
highest constitutional goods to the potential coarseness and amorality of 
commercial markets.74 Our main concern is therefore institutional, not 
ideological.75 In our view, collective goods are usually ill-suited to judicial 
disposition. We turn now to consider two case studies involving the 
problematic judicial treatment of collective goods, and to draw larger 
lessons from them. 
II. MONEY IS SPEECH 
The Court’s campaign finance jurisprudence can be characterized as a 
stalwart march to ever more permissive rules about spending money on 
political speech.76 This increasing permissiveness relies on a sometimes 
 
71. See supra notes 26–28 and accompanying text; supra Part I.B. 
72. See supra text accompanying notes 4–22. 
73. See infra Parts II & III; see also infra notes 210–214 (discussing cases) and 264 (identifying, 
and gesturing toward ways in which our account could fix, some incidents of constitutional 
commodification). 
74. See supra notes 38–43 and accompanying text. Our position does not represent an anti-
market or anti-economist view. We argue only that there are appropriate moral and political boundaries 
to economic markets. Again to echo two leading philosophers, “some things should not be for sale” 
because they constitute “what money can’t buy.” SANDEL, supra note 6; SATZ, supra note 6.  
75. For the view that ideology informs suspicion of judicial review, see, for example, Jack M. 
Balkin, Why Liberals and Conservatives Flipped on Judicial Restraint: Judicial Review in the Cycles of 
Constitutional Time (July 19, 2019) (unpublished manuscript), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm? 
abstract_id=3423135 (arguing that enthusiasm for judicial review depends both upon whether a majority 
of justices on the Supreme Court represent one’s political ideology and also where in the historical cycle 
of ideological dominance one finds oneself). Our skepticism, however, transcends the ideological 
composition of the Court. As a conceptual matter, we argue that collective goods should not be 
commodified by courts regardless of the political ideologies of those who would sit in judgment. It is 
true that legislative majorities may also take steps to commodify collective goods inappropriately or 
wrongly, but in our view this is generally a more democratically legitimate approach than the expansion 
of commodification by unelected judges. 












implicit, sometimes explicit equivalence between money and speech.77 
Countless scholars have aimed to identify why the equivalence is wrong—
morally, conceptually, and as a matter of constitutional law.78 We argue here 
that their accounts are sometimes incorrect and sometimes incomplete. A 
conception of political speech as a collective good of democratic self-
government, we contend, is necessary for elucidating the problem of 
unlimited spending on political speech. From this perspective, we urge the 
Court to halt its march toward a complete constitutional commodification 
of political speech, and perhaps begin to reverse it.79  
We begin by reviewing the cases equating money and political speech. 
Our focus is on money in electoral politics, but we acknowledge that 
money’s undue influence pervades politics elsewhere (e.g., lobbying), 
where free speech protections on spending money are at least as strong.80 
We then argue that the supposed equation of “money” and “speech” turns 
on an individualist conception of the First Amendment, which we contest. 
We advance a conception of political speech as a collective good, and then 
fit this argument into our theoretical framework of constitutional 
commodification. 
A. From Buckley to McCutcheon and Beyond 
Buckley v. Valeo81 was the first case where the Court ruled on the 
constitutionality of the Federal Elections Campaign Act (FECA) of 1971,82 
which was at the time “by far the most comprehensive[] reform legislation 
passed by Congress” on federal elections.83 Initially, the FECA received 
support from across the political spectrum, with even Mitch McConnell—
 
77. See infra Part II.D. 
78. See infra Part II.B.2. 
79. We appreciate that stare decisis may prevent complete reversal, at least in the near future, 
depending how strongly this value is weighed against the value of a correct constitutional decision in 
principle. 
80. See, e.g., United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 625–28 (1954) (recognizing First 
Amendment concerns regarding lobbying, but upholding legislative disclosure requirements to provide 
notice of potential influence because “[o]therwise the voice of the people may all too easily be drowned 
out by the voice of special interest groups seeking favored treatment while masquerading as proponents 
of the public weal”).  
Tabatha Abu El-Haj contends that the representation crisis results not so much from money as from 
the superior organizing and mobilizing forces of the wealthy relative to the poor. She urges progressive 
reformers to shift their focus away from campaign finance reform—which the wealthy are likely to 
circumvent anyway—and toward enhancing the civic organization of those with fewer material 
resources. Tabatha Abu El-Haj, Beyond Campaign Finance Reform, 57 B.C. L. REV. 1127, 1129–30 
(2016). Our emphasis on money in politics is somewhat at odds with her approach, but we find her 
efforts to mobilize individuals into collective speakers congenial to our view of political speech as a 
collective good. 
81. 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam). 
82. Pub. L. No. 92-225, 86 Stat. 3 (1972), amended by Pub L. No. 93-443, 88 Stat. 1263 (1974).  
83. Buckley v. Valeo, 519 F.2d 821, 831 (D.C. Cir. 1975), rev’d in part, 424 U.S. 1 (1976). 











who, as a Senator, went on to challenge spending restrictions on political 
speech84—referring to money in politics as a “cancer.”85 Among many other 
features, the FECA limited how much money an individual could contribute 
to any one federal political campaign ($1000), how much they could 
contribute to campaigns overall within a given year ($25,000), and how 
much they could spend on independent political speech ($1000).86  
In Buckley, the Court upheld the caps on campaign contributions, but it 
found unconstitutional the restrictions on independent expenditures for 
political speech.87 This speech includes radio or television ads expressly 
advocating the election or defeat of a candidate for office, paid for by 
individuals unconnected with the candidate’s campaign, and mounted 
without the candidate’s input or support.88 Importantly, the Court assessed 
the FECA’s limits not as restrictions on conduct (such as donating or 
spending) or restrictions on the means to produce or disseminate speech 
(including advertisements or airtime), but as restrictions on speech as 
such.89 As a result, all of the restrictions were subject to strict scrutiny.90 
The campaign contribution limits survived because they narrowly served 
the government’s compelling interest in preventing quid pro quo corruption 
or the appearance of such corruption.91 McCutcheon v. FEC 92 later scaled 
back even these restrictions, overturning overall campaign contribution caps 
on the ground that limits on contributions to individual campaigns were 
sufficient to forestall corruption or the appearance of corruption.93 
 
84. See McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93 (2003), partially overruled by Citizens United v. FEC, 
558 U.S. 310, 365–66 (2010). 
85. Mitch McConnell, Opinion, Election Ordinance Is, in Part, Reaction to Past Excesses, 
LOUISVILLE COURIER-J., Dec. 10, 1973, at A23. For a less partisan source of support, see HERBERT E. 
ALEXANDER, FINANCING THE 1972 ELECTION (1976). Alexander was taken to be the “leading 
commentator in the field of political reform” at the time. David Ifshin, An Analysis of the Impact of the 
Federal Election Campaign Act on the 1976 Democratic Presidential Primary, 18 SANTA CLARA L. 
REV. 1, 3 (1978). 
86. These are the dollar amounts established in 1974. The statute provides for periodic increases 
to the caps to control for inflation and the passage of time. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 88 (citing statute). 
87. Id. at 51. As Robert Post has noted, the Court’s distinction between “contributions” and 
“expenditures” was “arbitrary” and is now “unraveling” into “chaos” because of a lack of a theoretical 
foundation. ROBERT C. POST, CITIZENS DIVIDED: CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM AND THE 
CONSTITUTION 6 (2014). Our analysis here does not depend on this distinction, and our critique applies 
in principle to treatments of both contributions and expenditures.  
88. 11 C.F.R. § 100.16(a) (2019). 
89. Thus the Court distinguished the FECA restrictions from the prohibition against destroying 
one’s draft card challenged in United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968), arguing that “it is beyond 
dispute that the interest in regulating the alleged ‘conduct’ of giving or spending money ‘arises in some 
measure because the communication allegedly integral to the conduct is itself thought to be harmful.’” 
Buckley, 424 U.S. at 17 (quoting O’Brien, 391 U.S. at 382). 
90. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 14.  
91. Id. at 28–29.  
92. 572 U.S. 185 (2014).  












In contrast with its approach to campaign contributions, the Buckley 
Court was hostile to limits on independent expenditures because a majority 
of Justices believed they pose a far less significant threat of corruption.94 
And the Court was unwilling to consider that the restrictions might be 
justified on other grounds—namely to prevent wealthy citizens from 
exerting a disproportionate influence on electoral outcomes.95 In this 
connection, the Court announced its now famous edict that “the concept that 
government may restrict the speech of some elements of our society in order 
to enhance the relative voice of others is wholly foreign to the First 
Amendment.”96  
Consider more closely, however, the Court’s argument supporting this 
claim. The first premise states that the First Amendment was designed “to 
secure ‘the widest possible dissemination of information from diverse and 
antagonistic sources.’”97 Then the Court argues that spending restrictions 
“necessarily reduce[] the quantity of expression by restricting the number 
of issues discussed, the depth of their exploration, and the size of the 
audience reached.”98 Therefore, the Court reasons, spending restrictions are 
incompatible with the First Amendment.99 
 
94. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 45. 
95. Id. at 49–50. Charles Fried aptly summarizes the Court’s mistaken logic here: “only the five 
Pollyannas on the Supreme Court . . . would have us believe that those who have unlimited cash to spend 
on elections will not call the tune. Why else, after all, would the superrich spend their money on 
candidates instead of buying another Damien Hirst pickled sheep?” Charles Fried, Letter to the Editor, 
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 3, 2014, https://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/04/opinion/the-courts-ruling-on-political-
spending.html?src=rechp [https://perma.cc/3M9Z-XAYU].  
We now know that unlimited spending does more than enhance the franchise for some relative to 
others. It also produces legislation more favorable to the wealthy, thereby enhancing the power of the 
wealthy still more. See, e.g., LAWRENCE LESSIG, REPUBLIC, LOST: HOW MONEY CORRUPTS 
CONGRESS—AND A PLAN TO STOP IT 89–213 (2011) (describing a corrupt “economy of influence” 
caused by “so damn much money” in politics); Elizabeth Drew, How Money Runs Our Politics, N.Y. 
REV. BOOKS, June 4, 2015, https://www.nybooks.com/articles/2015/06/04/how-money-runs-our-politic 
s/ [https://perma.cc/6YFP-ZYJS] (“If people are concerned about the gaping and growing disparity of 
wealth in this country, the pattern of political donations is one place to look for its source.”); Daniel J.H. 
Greenwood, Essential Speech: Why Corporate Speech Is Not Free, 83 IOWA L. REV. 995, 997 (1998) 
(“To allow the regulated to capture the regulators threatens the entire system.”); THOMAS E. MANN & 
E. J. DIONNE, JR., CTR. FOR EFFECTIVE PUB. MGMT. AT BOOKINGS INST., THE FUTILITY OF NOSTALGIA 
AND THE ROMANTICISM OF THE NEW POLITICAL REALISTS: WHY PRAISING THE 19TH-CENTURY 
POLITICAL MACHINE WON'T SOLVE THE 21ST CENTURY'S PROBLEMS 26–27 (2015), https://www.brooki 
ngs.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/new_political_realists_mann_dionne.pdf [https://perma.cc/8LQJ-
45X2] (“The obstacles facing wealthy players have almost vanished. Super PACs and politically active 
nonprofits provide virtually unlimited opportunities for the wealthy to spend and for candidates to grovel 
before them. . . . Each election cycle brings bold new initiatives to evade what meager legal limits 
remain.”). 
96. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 48–49. 
97. Id. (quoting N.Y.Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 266 (1964)). 
98. Id. at 19 (emphasis added). 
99. Id. at 51. 











The Court is surely right to say that the First Amendment aims to 
guarantee the greatest audience for the greatest range of views.100 The 
problem arises in the second premise of the Court’s argument, where it 
contends that quantity and diversity of views go hand-in-hand.101 Even as 
an intuitive matter, the claim that more spending on speech means that more 
people will hear more viewpoints is flawed.  
To see this, imagine that, under a regime with spending restrictions, 
Crosby and Stills, who support roughly the same candidates and policies, 
can now each spend only half of what each would have spent had there been 
no restrictions. As a result, we have half as much speech from each of them 
as we would have had otherwise. But this means that there is now more time 
and more space for, say, Nash or Young to offer their views, completely 
distinct from the Crosby-Stills set of views.102 All other citizens would then 
have a better chance of hearing each of Crosby, Stills, Nash, and Young in 
a regime with spending restrictions because the airwaves will be less 
clogged and the newspapers or websites less crammed with only Crosby’s 
and Stills’ ads and speech.103  
Although this argument is admittedly theoretical rather than empirical, it 
is also commonsensical. Spending restrictions may well yield more speech 
on more topics reaching more people.104 Indeed, this is just the line of 
thought on which the Canadian Supreme Court based its support for 
rigorous restrictions on campaign contributions and expenditures.105 Other 
 
100. Id. at 48–49.  
101. Id. at 19; see also Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 413 (2000) (Thomas, J., 
dissenting) (noting that “the Court in Buckley explained that expenditure limits ‘represent substantial 
rather than merely theoretical restraints on the quantity and diversity of political speech’” (quoting 
Buckley, 424 U.S. at 19)).  
102. It is also likely that, under the original regime, where Crosby and Stills would each have 
offered twice as much speech, lower-resourced citizens might decline to speak at all. After all, what 
would be the point of spending money on political speech that would never get heard? In this way, 
unlimited spending can lead to less diverse speech, rather than more, especially with respect to citizens 
differentiated by class, wealth, and relative income. 
103. Cf. Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 472 (2010) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part) (noting that members of the public do not have “infinite free time to listen to and 
contemplate every last bit of speech uttered by anyone, anywhere”); CROSBY, STILLS, NASH & YOUNG, 
Find the Cost of Freedom, on SO FAR (Atlantic Recording Corp. 1974) (“Find the cost of freedom/buried 
in the ground.”). 
104. Theorists often offer the negative version of this claim, arguing that, without spending 
restrictions, fewer viewpoints will reach a wide audience. See, e.g., Fiss, supra note 65, at 1412 (“[T]he 
rich or powerful . . . [have] the resources at their disposal . . . to fill all the available space for public 
discourse with their message.”); The Supreme Court, 1999 Term—Leading Cases, 114 HARV. L. REV. 
179, 304 (2000) (“If money talks, then America's campaign finance system leaves the poor and the 
working class voiceless.”).  
105. Harper v. Canada (A.G.), [2004] 1 S.C.R. 827, 872 (Can.) (“If a few groups are able to flood 
the electoral discourse with their message, it is possible, indeed likely, that the voices of some will be 













countries also either impose limitations on spending or constrain political 
spending in other ways, such as restricting political campaign speech to 
defined windows before elections, or mandating shared access to political 
advertising on television and other media outlets.106 
Furthermore, the Court offers no evidence to undercut, let alone falsify, 
this commonsense prediction for how spending restrictions may in fact 
enhance First Amendment values. The Court correctly notes that “virtually 
every means of communicating ideas in today’s mass society requires the 
expenditure of money.”107 But that observation entails only that individuals 
ought to be permitted to spend some money on speech, not that they must 
be permitted to spend unlimited amounts of money.108 The Court needed to 
adduce evidence showing that any spending restrictions would undermine 
the First Amendment’s goal of ensuring robust debate on as diverse a 
number of issues and viewpoints as possible, and the Court did not.109 
Moreover, the Court probably could not have done so because there is 
almost no empirical research on the effects of unlimited spending on 
elections, as scholars have long lamented.110 In short, the Court was simply 
 
adequately informed of all views.” (citations omitted)); see also Libman v. Quebec (A.G.), [1997] 3 
S.C.R. 569, 599 (Can.) (“Owing to the competitive nature of elections, . . . spending limits are necessary 
to prevent the most affluent from monopolizing election discourse and consequently depriving their 
opponents of a reasonable opportunity to speak and be heard.”); POST, supra note 87, at 48 (describing 
the “full-throated expression” of “[t]he principle of equality” in Canadian campaign finance law).  
106. For an overview of comparative regimes, see, for example, Paul Waldman, How Our 
Campaign Finance System Compares to Other Countries, AM. PROSPECT (Apr. 4, 2014), https://prospect 
.org/article/how-our-campaign-finance-system-compares-other-countries [https://perma.cc/4S5N-GLD 
Q]; see also Vladyslav Dembitskiy, Note, Where Else Is the Appearance of Corruption Protected by the 
Constitution? A Comparative Analysis of Campaign Finance Laws After Citizens United and 
McCutcheon, 43 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 885, 909 (2016) (finding that U.S.-style treatment of 
“campaign finance as speech, not just manner of speech . . . is very different from how European courts 
treat money in politics”). 
107. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 19 (1976) (per curiam). 
108. Cf. Burt Neuborne, The Supreme Court and Free Speech: Love and a Question, 42 ST. LOUIS 
U. L.J. 789, 796 (1998) (arguing that the supposed equation between money and speech may hold true 
at lower levels of spending, but not at extremely high expenditure levels); E. Joshua Rosenkranz, The 
Dangers, and Promise, of Shrink Missouri, 24 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 71, 77 (2000) (same). 
Note also that the claim that speech costs money does not entail that each speaker must then be 
permitted to spend their own money on speech. We might instead give each citizen a political speech 
allowance or taxpayer-funded vouchers. See BRUCE ACKERMAN & IAN AYRES, VOTING WITH DOLLARS: 
A NEW PARADIGM FOR CAMPAIGN FINANCE 12–24 (2002) (describing government-funded “Patriot 
dollars” system); LESSIG, supra note 95, at 264–75 (describing various decentralized methods to align 
substantially the “funders” and “the People”). Our theory of political speech as a collective good 
provides a justification for these public-financed regimes. 
109. In addition to safeguarding “robust debate,” the Court argues that the First Amendment aims 
“to assure unfettered interchange of ideas for the bringing about of political and social changes desired 
by the people.” Buckley, 424 U.S. at 49 (quoting N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 269 (1964)). 
This argument is subject to the same critique: whether speech restrictions hinder or benefit “unfettered 
interchange” is an empirical matter that the Court does not explore.  
110. See, e.g., Stephen E. Gottlieb, The Dilemma of Election Campaign Finance Reform, 
 











incorrect to say that the objective “to secure ‘the widest possible 
dissemination of information from diverse and antagonistic sources’” 
requires unlimited spending.111 
Still, far from retreating from that stance, the Court has in the last decade 
doubled down on its conception of independent expenditures as warranting 
the same protection as speech. In 2010, Citizens United v. FEC 112 extended 
the right to spend unlimited amounts of money on political ads to 
corporations, which had until then been prohibited from spending their own 
funds on some kinds of political speech.113 Also in 2010, SpeechNOW.org 
v. FEC114 extended this right to raise and spend unlimited amounts of money 
independent of coordination with campaigns to so-called Super PACs 
(political action committees).115 Spending by Super PACs has increased 
exponentially since then in both non-presidential election years ($62 million 
in 2010 to $822 million in 2018) and presidential election years ($609 
million in 2012 to $1.067 billion in 2016).116 Super PACs have thus become 
the poster child of the Court’s “money is speech” philosophy.  
B. Individualist Approaches to Campaign Finance 
The problems with the Court’s campaign finance jurisprudence do not 
end with its unsupported empirical foundations. The voluminous case law 
following from Buckley is beset by another conceptual disconnect. On one 
hand, the Court repeatedly identifies as a key rationale the notion that robust 
political speech is of great importance to the polity. On the other hand, the 
 
18 HOFSTRA L. REV. 213, 230 (1989) (“In support of its acceptance of contribution limits, 
the Buckley Court claimed that such limits have a limited impact on speech. This is a claim, however, 
which science does not sustain.” (footnote omitted)); Nicholas O. Stephanopoulos, Aligning Campaign 
Finance Law, 101 VA. L. REV. 1425, 1479 (2015) (“This literature only now is emerging because the 
techniques for measuring voters’ and officeholders’ preferences previously did not exist.”); id. at 1494 
(“I am unaware of any empirical evidence on the impact of expenditures on candidates.”); cf. Prithviraj 
Datta, The Flawed Reasoning of the Citizens United Opinions 14 (2017) (unpublished manuscript) (on 
file with authors) (“There . . . exists little in the way of empirical evidence to support the contention that 
campaign spending is intended as, or has the effect of, persuading citizens by prompting reasoned 
evaluation on the part of those targeted by the messages that it funds.”).  
111. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 48–49 (quoting N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 266 (1964)). 
112. 558 U.S. 310 (2010). 
113. Id. at 319. 
114. 599 F.3d 686 (D.C. Cir. 2010). 
115. Id. at 696; see also RICHARD L. HASEN, PLUTOCRATS UNITED: CAMPAIGN MONEY, THE 
SUPREME COURT AND THE DISTORTION OF AMERICAN ELECTIONS 33 (2016) (describing the Super PAC 
as “a political action committee that can accept unlimited contributions to fund independent ads 
supporting or opposing federal candidates”). 
116. Outside Spending by Super PACs, CTR. FOR RESPONSIVE POL., https://www.opensecrets.org/ 
outsidespending/summ.php?cycle=2010&chrt=V&disp=O&type=S [https://perma.cc/M38L-G4R2] 
(giving annual totals in charts). Corporate funding levels are more difficult to track because of limitations 
on disclosure, which currently allow “dark money,” or indirect corporate contributions to Super PACS. 













Court evaluates political speech restrictions in light of their effect on 
individual speakers’ rights. In this way, the Court decides on the 
permissibility of speech restrictions without regard for a key rationale for 
protecting political speech in the first place.117  
The Court’s position across these cases might be termed laissez-faire.118 
Its egalitarian critics, however, are no less beholden to individualist 
commitments.119 
1. Laissez-Faire Free Speech 
The Court has become increasingly hostile to laws limiting the amount 
of money individuals can spend on political speech, especially where these 
laws aim to level the playing field between wealthy and non-wealthy 
citizens, or well- and poorly-funded candidates. In Buckley, the Court 
deemed this ambition “wholly foreign to the First Amendment,”120 and it 
has repeatedly rejected leveling measures in subsequent cases.121 In 
eschewing measures that would equalize access to audiences for political 
speakers, the Court’s approach has been decidedly individualistic.122 
More specifically, the Court conceives of equalizing measures in the 
campaign finance context as those that would deny one person, say, Peter, 
the full strength of his voice in order to enhance the voice of Paul, for Paul’s 
sake,123 or measures that would have Peter subsidize Paul’s speech, again 
 
117. In recent work, David Landau and Rosalind Dixon have developed the notion of “abusive 
judicial review,” which occurs where courts “intentionally undermine[] the minimum core of electoral 
democracy.” David Landau & Rosalind Dixon, Abusive Judicial Review: Courts Against Democracy, 
53 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. (forthcoming 2020) (manuscript at 10) (emphasis added), https://papers.ssrn.com 
/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3366602. We doubt that the Buckley Court deliberately sought to 
undermine our democracy. Indeed, we speculate that it is precisely the Court’s sense that it had faithfully 
interpreted the Constitution that accounts for the decision’s durability. 
118. See, e.g., David Cole, First Amendment Antitrust: The End of Laissez-Faire in Campaign 
Finance, 9 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 236 (1991). Elsewhere, this approach to campaign finance has been 
termed “libertarian.” See Frank Pasquale, Reclaiming Egalitarianism in the Political Theory of 
Campaign Finance Reform, 2008 U. ILL. L. REV. 599, 600, 616, 657. 
119. See Sanford Levinson, Regulating Campaign Activity: The New Road to Contradiction?, 83 
MICH. L. REV. 939, 944 (1985) (book review) (labelling this position “egalitarian”). 
120. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 48–49 (1976) (per curiam). 
121. See, e.g., McCutcheon v. FEC, 572 U.S. 185, 193 (2014) (plurality opinion); Ariz. Free Enter. 
Club's Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett, 564 U.S. 721, 749 (2011); Davis v. FEC, 554 U.S. 724, 742 
(2008).  
122. See Gregory P. Magarian, Speaking Truth to Firepower: How the First Amendment 
Destabilizes the Second, 91 TEX. L. REV. 49, 82 (2012) (“Current First Amendment doctrine has moved 
decisively toward the individualist justification for expressive freedom.”); id. (noting that the Court’s 
preference for individualist justifications of the First Amendment “emerges most strongly from the 
Court's approach to . . . campaign-finance regulation”). 
123. See, e.g., Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 340–41 (2010) (“By taking the right to speak 
from some and giving it to others, the Government deprives the disadvantaged person or class of the 
right to use speech to strive to establish worth, standing, and respect for the speaker’s voice.”).  











for Paul’s sake.124 In response, consider first that the polity as a whole might 
have an interest in hearing from both Peter and Paul, and spending 
restrictions might be aimed at serving that interest, rather than Paul’s 
interest alone. Put differently, the Court’s anti-egalitarian jurisprudence 
disregards the notion of political speech as a collective good, and focuses 
only on the individual right. 
Second, there is a problem, evident even within the individualist context, 
in that the Court presupposes a contestable baseline. Thus, Peter has a right 
to drown out Paul if Peter has the resources to do so. But, if one instead 
understands the First Amendment as conferring “a right of equal 
participation” in political debate, then Paul—and perhaps Mary and other 
citizens—would have a right to insist on reasonable regulations to limit 
Peter’s speech.125 The Court can champion Peter’s rights at Paul’s expense 
only because it implicitly eschews an egalitarian campaign finance 
regime.126  
2. Egalitarian Free Speech 
For egalitarians, one’s wealth should not determine the effectiveness of 
one’s voice.127 Egalitarians therefore criticize Buckley and its progeny,128 
and they advocate measures, including restrictions on political spending, 
that would equalize the strength of individual voices.129  
In contrast to the contention in Buckley that the greatest quantity and 
diversity of speech emerges where there are no spending restrictions, the 
 
124. See Ariz. Fee Enter. Club, 564 U.S. at 737 (“Once a privately financed candidate has raised 
or spent more than the State's initial grant to a publicly financed candidate, each personal dollar spent 
by the privately financed candidate results in an award of almost one additional dollar to his opponent.”).  
125. Libman v. Quebec (A.G.), [1997] 3 S.C.R. 569, 598–99 (Can.); cf. PETER, PAUL & MARY, 
Too Much of Nothing, on LATE AGAIN (Warner Bros.-Seven Arts 1968) (covering Bob Dylan) (“Too 
much of nothin’ can make a man feel ill at ease/One man's temper might rise, while the other man’s 
temper might freeze./In the days of long confessions, we can not mock a soul/When there's too much of 
nothin’, no one has control.”). 
126. Cf. First Nat’l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 809–10 (1978) (White, J., dissenting) 
(“[N]ot to impose limits upon the political activities of corporations would have placed [the government] 
in a position of departing from neutrality and indirectly assisting the propagation of corporate views 
because of the advantages its laws give to the corporate acquisition of funds to finance such activities.”). 
127. See, e.g., John Rawls, The Basic Liberties and Their Priority, in 3 THE TANNER LECTURES 
ON HUMAN VALUES 1, 43 (Sterling M. McMurrin ed., 1982) (“[T]hose with relatively greater means 
can combine together and exclude those who have less . . . . [from] the limited space of the political 
process . . . .”); Cass R. Sunstein, Political Equality and Unintended Consequences, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 
1390, 1390 (1994) (arguing that “there is no good reason to allow disparities in wealth to be translated 
into disparities in political power”); J. Skelly Wright, Money and the Pollution of Politics: Is the First 
Amendment an Obstacle to Political Equality?, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 609, 637 (1982).  
128. See, e.g., Sunstein, supra note 127, at 1392 (observing that “it is most troublesome if people 
with a good deal of money are allowed to translate their wealth into political influence”).  
129. See, e.g., Edward B. Foley, Equal-Dollars-Per-Voter: A Constitutional Principle of 












concern that the wealthy will drown out the poor has empirical support. We 
know that well-funded candidates “inundate” the airwaves with ads casting 
them in the best possible light.130 We know that candidates align with their 
donors and spenders,131 and wealthy individuals can and do spend more per 
capita on political speech than others.132 In this way, a regime without 
spending restrictions confers an advantage on the wealthy.133 
One might have thought that the disparity in political influence as 
between wealthy and poor would suffice to justify some spending 
restrictions, allowing for the egalitarian position to triumph. Yet the 
egalitarian position has been notoriously difficult to defend. This is partly 
because money is not the only resource that can be converted into political 
influence. Time and fame, for example, can also augment a person’s voice 
and influence, and each of them, like wealth, is unequally distributed across 
the electorate. 134 For example, college students can spend many more hours 
on social media than can parents who work full-time. Celebrities like 
 
130. E.g., Datta, supra note 110, at 10–11. 
131. See Stephanopoulos, supra note 110, at 1494. 
132. For example, in the 2018 elections, only 0.47 percent of Americans gave $200 or more each, 
but together these spenders accounted for over 71 percent of all money contributed to federal candidates, 
PACs, parties, and outside groups. Donor Demographics, CTR. FOR RESPONSIVE POL., https://www.ope 
nsecrets.org/overview/donordemographics.php [https://perma.cc/E7Q4-NLHG]. 
133. See Christina Pazzanese, The Costs of Inequality: Increasingly, It’s the Rich and the Rest, 
HARV. GAZETTE (Feb. 8, 2016), http://news.harvard.edu/gazette/story/2016/02/the-costs-of-inequality-
increasingly-its-the-rich-and-the-rest/ [https://perma.cc/2BMK-HHBB]; cf. Abu El-Haj, supra note 80, 
at 1128 (“The political influence of moneyed elites even extends to issues where a clear majority of 
citizens disagree with their policy preferences.”). 
Sanford Levinson has argued that it is not unlimited spending per se that troubles egalitarians but 
instead the viewpoints likely to be disseminated by those with the most money to spend. Consider the 
following hypothetical:  
 If both political views and the propensity to spend money on politics were distributed 
randomly among the entire populace, it is hard to see why anyone would be very excited about 
the whole issue of campaign finance. It is only because we know there is no such randomization 
that we are concerned about spending by the rich. 
Levinson, supra note 119, at 945. 
In response, note that the concern about too much speech is not necessarily dependent on the content 
of that speech: we want all viewpoints to be heard, and unlimited spending might overwhelm us, leaving 
us with nothing but cacophony. However, our commodification critique draws out a further concern. If 
each of us has equal resources and can spend as much as he or she likes, we might be less inclined to 
aim for the most powerful or persuasive rhetoric, preferring quantity to quality, or choosing to spend 
money on ads instead of engaging in arguably more meaningful forms of political participation. In other 
words, unlimited spending may also cheapen and degrade political speech. See also infra Part II.D. 
134. As Peter Schuck observes, “[m]oney is only one of many sources of influence over 
politicians.” PETER H. SCHUCK, ONE NATION UNDECIDED: CLEAR THINKING ABOUT FIVE HARD ISSUES 
THAT DIVIDE US 227 (2017) (emphasis omitted). Others include 
better organizational skills; friendship; past contacts or ties; the size, intensity, and thus 
influence of interest groups; tactical expertise; valuable information; media access and free 
(known as ‘earned’) TV time; personal charisma or eloquence; name recognition; dynastic 
power; persuasive arguments; propitious timing; a compelling life story; and still others—
especially incumbency. 
Id. Many of these factors may also, of course, correlate with relative wealth. 











will.i.am can reach many more people with their messages than can the 
average Joe.135 
This poses a problem for the egalitarian because there looks to be no 
principled basis for treating money differently from time or prominence. 
Egalitarians must then either accept restrictions on all of the elements that 
confer an advantage on the speaker unconnected with the merits of the 
content of their speech—which would likely involve intolerable limits on 
individual liberty136—or resign themselves to having no restrictions on 
individuals’ wielding their time, prominence, oratory powers, good looks, 
and other advantages, as well as their money, in an unequal manner.  
There is a way out of this conundrum, but it appears only once one 
realizes that the egalitarian and laissez-faire positions share the same flaw. 
Both conceive of free speech only in terms of the right of the individual 
person to participate in politics. To be sure, the two positions differ with 
respect to what factors ought to be permitted to condition the effectiveness 
of the individual person’s exercise of that right, with the egalitarian thinking 
that the right is respected only if everyone has an equal (or at least a fair) 
chance of being heard, and the laissez-faire theorist thinking that the right 
is respected only if it is unrestricted. But both share the view that political 
free speech is first and foremost a right of and for the individual. 
Consider instead that it is in the interest of all of us—that is, the polity 
as a whole—to hear from all citizens.137 This is precisely the interest that 
Buckley took to lie at the First Amendment’s foundation when the Court 
proclaimed that it was intended “to secure ‘the widest possible 
 
135. Will.i.am famously stumped for Barack Obama, including creating a YouTube video that 
was viewed by over 26 million people. WeCan08, Yes We Can – Barack Obama Music Video, YOUTUBE 
(Feb. 2, 2008), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jjXyqcx-mYY; see also Davis v. FEC, 554 U.S. 724, 
742 (2008); Joel L. Fleishman, Freedom of Speech and Equality of Political Opportunity: The 
Constitutionality of the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, 51 N.C. L. REV. 389, 458–65 (1973); 
Levinson, supra note 119, at 948–50; cf. David W. Adamany, Money, Politics, and Democracy: A 
Review Essay, 71 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 289, 295 (1977) (noting the same set of disparities when it comes 
to the appeal of different candidates). 
136. See Levinson, supra note 119, at 950 (proposing a hypothetical and disturbing world in which 
“no person will be allowed to spend more than two hours a week (or 100 hours per year) on political 
activity,” and concluding that “[c]learly, it would be hard to imagine a proposal more offensive to 
traditional civil libertarians”). Robert Post also rejects such a regime, writing that the processes for 
participation must “offer a meaningful opportunity to shape the content of public opinion.” POST, supra 
note 87, at 50 (emphasis added). He opposes proposals where the opportunity to participate is regulated 
in a manner of one-size-fits-all, such as in a regime where each citizen is given five minutes on public 
access television. Id. Post is surely right that we don’t have to standardize access in this way to achieve 
generally equal participation. He shows that equality of access is not sufficient for guaranteeing 
meaningful participation, but this does not disprove that some degree of equality of access is necessary.  
137. Or, to put the point in a way that a disaffected or reclusive citizen might, it is in the interest 













dissemination of information from diverse and antagonistic sources.’”138 
We have this collective interest because we are joined together as citizens 
in the collective project of self-governance. As Robert Post argues, “a 
primary purpose of First Amendment rights is to make possible the value of 
self-government.”139 We want to enable people to speak about political 
matters not only because we care about their self-expression, but because 
having a wide variety of views available will allow us to arrive together at 
the best solution or approach, or at least the most democratic compromise.140 
The Court has failed to see this because it mistakenly abandoned a 
jurisprudential understanding of political speech as a collective good.141  
C. Political Speech as a Collective Good 
Not long ago, the Court had recognized the value of political speech as a 
collective good. It did so not only in cases that were avowedly 
“collectivist,”142 but also in cases that otherwise resolutely conceived of free 
speech as an individual right.143  
 
138. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 48–49 (1976) (per curiam) (quoting N.Y. Times Co. v. 
Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 266 (1964)). 
139. POST, supra note 87, at 4. 
140. See ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM: THE CONSTITUTIONAL POWERS OF 
THE PEOPLE 55 (1960) (arguing that “the First Amendment . . . is single-minded. It has no concern about 
the ‘needs of many men to express their opinions.’ It provides, not for many men, but for all men.” 
(quoting ZECHARIAH CHAFEE, JR., FREE SPEECH IN THE UNITED STATES 14 (1942))).  
Recent work in political theory suggests that democratic governance and deliberation make wiser 
and more efficient, as well as more just, decisions than alternative approaches. See generally 
COLLECTIVE WISDOM: PRINCIPLES AND MECHANISMS (Hélène Landemore & Jon Elster eds., 2014); 
HÉLÈNE LANDEMORE, DEMOCRATIC REASON: POLITICS, COLLECTIVE INTELLIGENCE, AND THE RULE 
OF THE MANY (2013). 
141. Although we have construed the egalitarian rationale as distinct from, and sometimes in 
tension with, the collective self-governance rationale, others have sought to synthesize these two 
rationales into one vision of the First Amendment’s purpose. See, e.g., Jack M. Balkin, Commentary, 
Digital Speech and Democratic Culture: A Theory of Freedom of Expression for the Information Society, 
79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 35 (2004). Jeffrey Blum articulates and defends a First Amendment principle of 
“equal liberty and collective right.” Blum, supra note 13, at 1339–45. He deploys this principle to argue 
that a campaign finance regime without spending restrictions is likely to corrupt democratic politics by 
undermining government’s autonomy from private market forces. In this way, Blum identifies a 
persuasive justification, consistent with the end of promoting collective self-governance, for spending 
restrictions. However, this justification is not alone sufficient. To see this, suppose that the government 
turned to public financing of campaigns and allowed for no independent expenditures at all. That 
arrangement might quell Blum’s anti-corruption worries, but it wouldn't necessarily best serve the goal 
of collective self-governance, especially if the amount of money each candidate received under the 
public financing scheme was insufficient to allow the citizenry to encounter the full range of views on 
all matters of political importance. For this reason, we believe that our conception of what the “collective 
good” requires is better suited to the project of collective self-governance. See infra Part II.C. 
142. See POST, supra note 65, at 280 (describing the Red Lion case as “the one decision of the 
Supreme Court that unambiguously relies on the collectivist theory” of the First Amendment). 
143. See Blum, supra note 13, at 1339 (describing “a growing judicial recognition of the idea of 
collective right” in the First Amendment context); Lyrissa Barnett Lidsky, Nobody's Fools: The Rational 
 











The high-water mark of the Court’s collectivist orientation to free speech 
is Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC,144 where the Court identified as 
controlling “the First Amendment goal of producing an informed public 
capable of conducting its own affairs.”145 It framed the public’s interest as 
a “collective right.”146 On these grounds, the Court upheld a requirement of 
equal access to the airwaves for politicians on both sides of a controversial 
public issue.147 Red Lion thus “interpreted the First Amendment rights of 
the public in light of the constitutional imperative of informed public 
decision making.”148 
In another formative case, Whitney v. California,149 Justice Louis 
Brandeis advanced an even more powerful vision of political speech as a 
collective good.150 He cast robust political speech not only as an individual 
right but also as a civic “duty,” thereby suggesting that political speech is 
something the individual undertakes not only for their own sake but also for 
the collective good of the polity.151 
Even in cases abolishing spending limits on individualist grounds, one 
can find evocations of political speech as a collective good. Buckley itself is 
 
Audience as First Amendment Ideal, 2010 U. ILL. L. REV. 799, 839 (“[A] core purpose of the First 
Amendment is to foster the ideal of democratic self-governance. In fact, First Amendment doctrine has 
been consciously fashioned to reinforce this ideal.”). 
144. 395 U.S. 367 (1969). 
145. Id. at 392; see also Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 74–75 (1964) (“[S]peech concerning 
public affairs is more than self-expression; it is the essence of self-government.”); United States v. Auto. 
Workers, 352 U.S. 567, 593 (1957) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (emphasis added) (“Under our Constitution 
it is We The People who are sovereign. . . . The people determine through their votes the destiny of the 
nation. It is therefore important—vitally important— . . . that the people have access to the views of 
every group in the community.”); Marjorie Heins & Eric M. Freedman, Foreword: Reclaiming the First 
Amendment: Constitutional Theories of Media Reform, 35 HOFSTRA L. REV. 917, 922 (2007) (heralding 
Red Lion for providing “an expansive view of the First Amendment that recognized society’s interest in 
a broad diversity of ideas as a value at least as important as—and in the broadcast context, more 
important than—an individual’s or corporation’s interest in communicating its point of view”). 
146. Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 390 (“[T]he people as a whole retain their interest in free speech by 
radio and their collective right to have the medium function consistently with the ends and purposes of 
the First Amendment.” (emphasis added)); see also FCC v. League of Women Voters of Cal., 468 U.S. 
364, 380 (1984) (referring to “the public’s First Amendment interest in receiving a balanced presentation 
of views on diverse matters of public concern”). 
147. Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 400–01. 
148. POST, supra note 87, at 78; see also Cass R. Sunstein, Does Red Lion Still Roar?, 60 ADMIN. 
L. REV. 767, 777–78 (2008) (advocating for a revival and reinvention of Red Lion’s principles for a 
cable news, social media era). 
149. 274 U.S. 357 (1927). 
150. Id. at 375 (Brandeis, J., concurring). Whitney is quoted at length in New York Times Co. v. 
Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964), which celebrates the role of unfettered speech in collective self-
government, id. at 270–71, and which is itself quoted at length in Buckley in support of the idea that 
effective democratic self-rule requires the greatest quantity and diversity of views. Buckley v. Valeo, 
424 U.S. 1, 14–15, 48, 49 (1976) (per curiam). 
151. Whitney, 274 U.S. at 375 (Brandeis, J., concurring) (“Those who won our independence 
believed . . . that the greatest menace to freedom is an inert people; that public discussion is a political 












exemplary on this score. There, the Court recognized that “Congress was 
legislating for the ‘general welfare’”—in particular, to ensure an electoral 
process that had integrity and was inclusive.152 Further, the Court identified 
the promotion of collective self-government as a fundamental rationale for 
the First Amendment: “In a republic where the people are sovereign, the 
ability of the citizenry to make informed choices among candidates for 
office is essential, for the identities of those who are elected will inevitably 
shape the course that we follow as a nation.”153 
These passages from Buckley show that what is most centrally contested 
in campaign finance jurisprudence is not whether robust, unfettered political 
speech is essential to the polity as a whole, but instead how this collective 
good intersects with the interests of individual speakers—and which of 
these two sets of objectives should prevail when they conflict. 
Much of the Court’s free speech jurisprudence results from this conflict 
between the collective good and individual rights of free speech. The 
conflict can be seen, for example, in cases that address the rights of a 
speaker versus those of listeners.154 It appears also in the tension between 
collective self-governance and individual self-authorship conceptions of the 
First Amendment.155  
Another illustration of the conflict between the individualist and 
collectivist conceptions of free speech appears in the divided opinions in 
McCutcheon v. FEC.156 There, Justice Roberts, championing the 
deregulatory stance that prevailed, adopted the now-familiar individualist 
position that opposes equalization. The Court, he said, has “made clear that 
Congress may not regulate contributions simply to . . . restrict the political 
participation of some in order to enhance the relative influence of others.”157 
Justice Breyer, dissenting, refused to frame the issue as a contest between 
the speech rights of different individual citizens. Instead, he used the term 
 
152. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 90–91. 
153. Id. at 14–15. 
154. See, e.g., Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969) (“It is the right of the 
viewers and listeners, not the right of the broadcasters, which is paramount.”); Jessica A. Levinson, The 
Original Sin of Campaign Finance Law: Why Buckley v. Valeo Is Wrong, 47 U. RICH. L. REV. 881, 886 
(2013) (“The importance of free speech arguably lies primarily with the listener, not the speaker.”). 
155. See Robert Post, Reconciling Theory and Doctrine in First Amendment Jurisprudence, 
88 CALIF. L. REV. 2353, 2372 (2000); see also THOMAS I. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF 
EXPRESSION 6 (1970) (grounding free speech protections in a right to individual self-fulfillment); Martin 
H. Redish, The Value of Free Speech, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 591, 593 (1982) (arguing that “the 
constitutional guarantee of free speech ultimately serves only one true value, which I have labeled 
‘individual self-realization’”); Thomas Scanlon, A Theory of Freedom of Expression, 1 PHIL. & PUB. 
AFF. 204, 211–13 (1972) (grounding free expression in individual autonomy).  
156. 572 U.S. 185, 191, 237 (2014). 
157. Id. at 191.  











“collective speech” for the first time in the Court’s jurisprudence,158 and 
argued that “the First Amendment advances not only the individual’s right 
to engage in political speech, but also the public’s interest in preserving a 
democratic order in which collective speech matters.”159 As such, he 
emphasized, any conflict between individual and collective rights “takes 
place within, not outside, the First Amendment’s boundaries.”160 By his 
lights, evaluating speech restrictions requires balancing the individual right 
to convey one’s message with other considerations and protections, 
including the collective right to absorb as many different messages as 
possible. 
We do not seek to resolve the general tension between individual and 
collective speech rights in this Article. For our purposes, it is sufficient to 
demonstrate that this jurisprudence provides considerable support for the 
notion that political speech is a collective good, and that the Court as well 
as Congress should protect this conception.161 Having recognized as much, 
we can now see why the constitutional commodification of money as 
political speech is so deeply problematic.  
D. Commodification of the Collective Good of Political Speech 
Buckley’s approach has been distilled into the slogan that “money is 
speech.”162 The slogan captures the bivalent dynamics of constitutional 
commodification. First, speech is reduced to a commodity, and so can be 
purchased in whatever quantities the speaker desires and can afford. Second, 
money, identified with speech, is given speech’s constitutional protections 
against government restriction.163  
 
158. Id. at 237 (Breyer, J., dissenting); see also Josh Blackman, Collective Liberty, 67 HASTINGS 
L.J. 623, 628–41 (2016).  
159. McCutcheon, 572 U.S. at 237 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
160. Id. at 239. 
161. It is consistent, on our view, to conceive of political speech as both a collective good and an 
individual right, each reinforcing the other. See also infra text accompanying notes 176–177. 
162. See, e.g., Kenneth J. Levit, Note, Campaign Finance Reform and the Return of Buckley v. 
Valeo, 103 YALE L.J. 469, 503 (1993) (describing the Court’s campaign finance jurisprudence as 
embodying the “theory that all money equals speech”); Maneesh Sharma, Money as Property: The 
Effects of Doctrinal Misallocation on Campaign Finance Reform, 41 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 715, 715 
(2008) (“The Court's doctrine is often summed up in a familiar catchphrase: ‘money equals speech.’”); 
see also supra note 2 and accompanying text. But cf. Gregory Klass, The Very Idea of a First Amendment 
Right Against Compelled Subsidization, 38 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1087, 1138 (2005) (“I have argued that 
when money is spent for speech, it does not, for First Amendment purposes, magically become 
equivalent to speech.”); Wright, supra note 2, at 1005 (“[N]othing in the First Amendment commits us 
to the dogma that money is speech.”).  
163. On the double-faceted nature of constitutional commodification, see supra text 












1. The Market for Political Speech  
Buckley may enshrine the idea that money spent on speech is equivalent 
to speech, but the assimilation of the free market and free speech does not 
originate with Buckley. As others have noted, the whole idea of a 
“marketplace of ideas” recruits commercial rhetoric to structure our 
conception of what free speech means and why we should value it.164 Justice 
Oliver Wendell Holmes in Abrams v. United States165 famously declared: 
“[T]he ultimate good desired is better reached by free trade in ideas—that 
the best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the 
competition of the market . . . .”166  
The market metaphor is given powerful voice in the Buckley opinion 
when the Court advances a revealing analogy: “Being free to engage in 
unlimited political expression subject to a ceiling on expenditures is like 
being free to drive an automobile as far and as often as one desires on a 
single tank of gasoline.”167 However, the analogy presupposes a 
consumerist, atomistic orientation to market goods.168 Qua market good, 
one can purchase as many cars as one wants, fill one’s gas tank as often as 
one wishes, and drive as much and as far as one would like. All of these are 
private, individual decisions, not ordinarily subject to direct government 
regulation. Political speech is unlike an individual’s decision to drive a car 
precisely because it is a good in which we all share. When the Court treats 
speech like any other good, it engages in commodification by constitutional 
implication.169 
The Court’s analogy is nonetheless apt for our purposes, since it draws 
out a conceptual connection between the “money is speech” and “waste is 
commerce” dynamics. Just as too much unequal speech undermines the 
collective good of political self-government, so can too much driving 
assault the collective goods of clean air and a healthy atmosphere.170 In both 
cases, we must contend with the aggregate effects of individual acts on 
collective goods.  
 
164. See, e.g., Post, supra note 155, at 2356. 
165. 250 U.S. 616 (1919).  
166. Id. at 630 (Holmes, J., dissenting). Holmes dissented from the Court’s holding that the 
Sedition Act of 1918 was compatible with the First Amendment. His famous statement has been quoted 
in sixteen subsequent Supreme Court cases. See, e.g., United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709, 728 
(2012); Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 51 (1988); FEC v. Mass. Citizens for Life, 479 
U.S. 238, 257 (1986). 
167. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 19 n.18 (1976) (per curiam). 
168. See supra text accompanying notes 37–43; cf. MARY ANNE FRANKS, THE CULT OF THE 
CONSTITUTION 117–27 (2019) (criticizing “the myth of the marketplace” as too biased and restricted); 
Gottlieb, supra note 110, at 230 (“In Buckley, the Court supported an individual view of politics.”). 
169. See supra text accompanying notes 21–22. 
170. See also infra Part III. 











2. The Constitutionalization of Money 
The problem with the Court’s free speech jurisprudence is not simply 
that it treats political speech just like any commodity but also that it 
constitutionalizes money itself, immunizing it from any restrictions that the 
government could otherwise constitutionally impose.171 This is the real 
force of the slogan that “money is speech,” illustrating the second dynamic 
in constitutional commodification, namely the constitutionalization of a 
commodity.172 
Notwithstanding the Court’s declarations, money is not really speech any 
more than time or fame is speech, though all three can facilitate the 
dissemination of one’s message.173 At best, money deserves constitutional 
protection only derivatively, because of its role in allowing one’s speech to 
reach its target. The amount of protection money deserves cannot then be 
greater than the amount of protection political speech itself deserves. Yet 
this is the outcome of the constitutionalization of money. The money-is-
speech equation paradoxically and perhaps unintentionally makes spending 
restrictions unconstitutional not in furtherance of political speech but 
instead at its expense. This is because constitutionally protecting money as 
speech in an absolute manner empowers some who are rich to drown out 
many who are not.174 If it is political speech that we care about ultimately, 
then it follows that the spending of money in politics should be regulated 
within reasonable limits. More pointedly, we cannot treat both speech and 
money as equivalent, and subject to the same amount of constitutional 
protection, because political speech, when conceived of as a collective 
good, requires spending and contribution restrictions.175 
 
171. Cf. Timothy K. Kuhner, Citizens United as Neoliberal Jurisprudence: The Resurgence of 
Economic Theory, 18 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 395, 424 (2011) (describing how the Court in Citizens 
United “performed constitutional alchemy in order to turn money into speech—that is, to turn economic 
currency into political currency”). 
172. See supra text accompanying notes 18–20. 
173. See, e.g., Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 398 (2000) (Stevens, J., concurring) 
(“I make one simple point. Money is property; it is not speech.”); cf. Deborah Hellman, Money Talks 
but It Isn't Speech, 95 MINN. L. REV. 953 (2011) (using the example of money’s role in facilitating 
speech to develop an account of when a constitutional right entails, or does not entail, a right to spend 
money in furtherance of that right). 
Note that we are not saying that money is “property” rather than “speech,” and therefore any 
regulation of spending or contributions for political reasons should be permitted. See POST, supra note 
87, at 45–46 (criticizing this argument). We agree that some level of spending and contribution of money 
should be constitutionally protected. Our objection is that the “money is speech” formulation forecloses 
the possibility of any limits at all.  
174. See supra notes 130–135 and accompanying text. 
175. Cf. Tabatha Abu El-Haj, “Live Free or Die”—Liberty and the First Amendment, 78 OHIO 
ST. L.J. 917, 919 (2017) (“[T]he free speech rights of individuals cannot be so extensive as to undermine 












One might object that our analysis unduly diminishes the rights of 
individuals, but we do not deny individuals’ rights as either speakers or 
listeners. We simply also recognize another right based in a more general 
good—namely, a collective right to hear as diverse a range of views as 
possible and a related right of the public not to be inundated with political 
speech distorted inordinately and unequally by large amounts of money.176 
We agree that individual speech rights entail First Amendment protection 
for some reasonable amount of spending, but not unlimited spending, 
especially in a world of increasingly radical divergence between the very 
rich and everyone else.177  
Nothing in the Court’s prior jurisprudence establishes a basis for an 
absolute, unlimited right of spending on political speech as a matter of logic 
or principle. The Court should therefore halt its rampant 
constitutionalization of money and allow for reasonable legal protections of 
the foundations of our collective good of democratic government.178 
 
176. See, e.g., BENJAMIN I. PAGE, JASON SEAWRIGHT & MATTHEW J. LACOMBE, BILLIONAIRES 
AND STEALTH POLITICS 54–76 (2018) (documenting various strategies the very wealthy use to influence 
politics in the United States often in their own economic self-interest).  
177. Economic inequality in the United States continues to spike to record levels. See, e.g., 
Emmanuel Saez & Gabriel Zucman, Wealth Inequality in the United States Since 1913: Evidence from 
Capitalized Income Tax Data, 131 Q.J. ECON. 519, 519 (2016) (finding that the “top 0.1% wealth share 
has risen from 7% in 1978 to 22% in 2012” in the United States, and the “bottom 90% wealth share first 
increased up to the mid-1980s and then steadily declined”); Rakesh Kochhar & Anthony Cilluffo, How 
Wealth Inequality Has Changed in the U.S. Since the Great Recession, by Race, Ethnicity and Income, 
PEW RES. CTR. (Nov. 1, 2017), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2017/11/01/how-wealth-inequalit 
y-has-changed-in-the-u-s-since-the-great-recession-by-race-ethnicity-and-income/ [https://perma.cc/T 
BX9-F4A9] (“Wealth gaps between upper-income families and lower- and middle-income families are 
at the highest levels recorded.”).  
178. To say that we are open to a “reasonableness” limitation on the regulation of political 
campaign finance raises the question, of course, of what restrictions on spending on political speech 
would go too far. For some recommendations for reform, see our Conclusion infra. Suffice it to say here 
that one can imagine various kinds of fairness rules regarding television and social media advertising, 
as well as some general limits on spending on behalf of particular candidates, including even oneself. 
The current regime in the United States appears increasingly to favor self-funded billionaires 
running for office. See, e.g., Chase Peterson-Withorn, Trump Isn’t America’s Only Billionaire 
Politician—Meet the Others, FORBES (Jan. 20, 2017, 5:50 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/chasewi 
thorn/2017/01/20/trump-isnt-americas-only-billionaire-politician-meet-the-others/#378ca4e52a65 [http 
s://perma.cc/L3E7-TTWA]. As of this writing, Tom Steyer and perhaps Andrew Yang are billionaire 
candidates for President in the Democratic primaries, and quite a few are multi-millionaires. Grace 
Panetta, Billionaire Tom Steyer Is Running for President — Here's Everything We Know About the Net 
Worth and Personal Finances of Each 2020 Democratic Presidential Candidate, BUS. INSIDER (July 9, 
2019, 12:54 PM), https://www.businessinsider.com/estimated-net-worth-wealth-2020-democratic-pr 
esidential-candidates-2019-4 [https://perma.cc/5KXQ-U3TY]. Michael Bloomberg has announced 
similar intentions.  Alexander Burns & Katie Glueck, Testing Waters, Bloomberg Ripples Uneasy Pool, 
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 9, 2019, at A1. But there is no intrinsic reason, we believe, to allow billionaire 
Presidents to become the rule rather than the exception.  
One-person-one-vote suggests an analogous principle of relative equality in the political influence 
that citizens should have in terms of expressions of their political views and support of candidates. 











III. WASTE IS COMMERCE 
In this Part, we consider a series of cases decided under the negative or 
“dormant” Commerce Clause, which have held, beginning with City of 
Philadelphia v. New Jersey,179 that “waste . . . is ‘commerce.’”180 We argue 
that the Supreme Court has erred in these cases when it overrode the 
traditional state law prerogative of governing land use to protect human 
health and the natural environment.181 In essence, the Court used the 
Constitution to commodify the business of waste disposal, holding that it 
counted as “commerce” in the same sense that markets for milk, meat, or 
corporate securities are “commerce.” As we show, a long and tortuous line 
of cases followed Philadelphia, eventually resulting in a provisional 
resolution of the complications raised by this intrusion of federal judicial 
power into the traditional bailiwick of the states. 
After tracing the threads of constitutional commodification in these 
cases, we conclude that this legal story serves as another cautionary tale of 
the trouble that this kind of commodification can cause for non-commercial 
values, in this case the collective good of the natural environment, which 
should be protected from degradation. In particular, we argue, with the 
benefit of historical perspective, that former Chief Justice William 
Rehnquist was right to warn about the Court’s overreach into the traditional 
regulation of land use in decisions that privileged commercial contracts 
 
179. 437 U.S. 617 (1978).  
180. Id. at 621; see also Fort Gratiot Sanitary Landfill, Inc. v. Mich. Dep’t of Nat. Res., 504 U.S. 
353, 359 (1992) (“Solid waste, even if it has no value, is an article of commerce.”). The cases following 
City of Philadelphia are identified and discussed infra Part III.A. 
The Commerce Clause confers plenary power on Congress to pass legislation “[t]o regulate 
Commerce . . . among the several States.” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. When Congress acts in a positive 
manner by enacting statutes, its constitutional authority under the Commerce Clause has been interpreted 
to be very broad. When Congress does not act, however, the Court has long held the Commerce Clause 
to impose a negative constraint to prevent state governments from discriminating against interstate 
commerce, even in the absence of Congressional action: hence the synonymous term “dormant” 
Commerce Clause. See 1 LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 807–33, 1029–150 
(3d ed. 2000). 
181. See, e.g., John R. Nolon, In Praise of Parochialism: The Advent of Local Environmental Law, 
26 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 365, 366 (2002) (affirming a “national understanding that the power to control 
the private use of land is a state prerogative”); Ashira Pelman Ostrow, Land Law Federalism, 61 EMORY 
L.J. 1397, 1399 (2012) (“Despite the expansion of the federal government over the past century, local 
governments have retained primary authority to regulate the use of land.”). 
The narrative of what has become “environmental law” can be told as a progressive assertion of 
federal authority over property and land use jurisdiction traditionally exercised by the states. States and 
local authorities responded initially to problems of pollution and waste disposal, but the complexity and 
scale of these problems, as well as the scientific requirements for effectively managing them, led to 
federal interventions. See LAZARUS, supra note 31, at 1–23. This intervention commonly takes the form 
of federal statutes and regulations enacted under their authority. Id. at 47–54, 67–75, 106–16, 169–207. 
In contrast, in the negative Commerce Clause cases discussed here, the Supreme Court is reaching out 












made about the land.182 His arguments sound in language and principles 
congenial to our understanding of both collective goods and constitutional 
commodification.  
A. From Philadelphia to United Haulers: Commodifying the Environment 
The story of the constitutional commodification of waste begins, like the 
infamous voyage of the Khian Sea, in Philadelphia.183 In City of 
Philadelphia v. New Jersey, the Court first applied the negative Commerce 
Clause to restrict state authority to regulate waste in interstate commerce.184 
The Court held unconstitutional a New Jersey statute that prohibited 
importing most “solid or liquid waste which originated or was collected 
outside the territorial limits of the State” into New Jersey for disposal.185 
The New Jersey legislature said it was motivated by environmental 
protection: to preserve its land.186 It claimed an environmental purpose to 
assure public health and safety, which is an area recognized traditionally as 
within a state’s authority in the absence of conflicting federal regulation.187 
The New Jersey Supreme Court agreed, concluding the statute was 
“designed to protect, not the State’s economy, but its environment.”188 
However, the U.S. Supreme Court felt no need even to inquire into the 
New Jersey state legislature’s motive or purpose.189 Justice Stewart’s 
majority opinion argued that “the evil of protectionism can reside in 
 
182. See infra note 210 and accompanying text. 
183. The Khian Sea set sail from Philadelphia in August 1986 with 13,500 tons of hazardous 
incinerator ash. The ash was rejected by the Bahamas, and the ship then travelled around the Caribbean 
for about a year. In November 1987, the Khian Sea got a new captain in Honduras, and sailed to Haiti, 
where about half of the ash was unloaded before military officers intervened. The ship then returned to 
Delaware, received new orders, and dumped ash into the Atlantic Ocean until its equipment broke down. 
After docking in Yugoslavia in July 1988, the ship again dumped ash in the Indian and Pacific Oceans 
before arriving empty in Singapore. See World's Most Unwanted Garbage: Cargo of the Khian Sea, 
NEATORAMA (Aug. 15, 2007, 10:52 AM), https://www.neatorama.com/2007/08/15/worlds-most-unw 
anted-garbage-cargo-of-the-khian-sea/ [https://perma.cc/WVD2-FAY9]. The president and vice-
president of the company were convicted of perjury. United States v. Reilly, 33 F.3d 1396 (3d Cir. 1994). 
A number of company officials had earlier been held in contempt for violating a temporary restraining 
order. Joseph Paolino & Sons, Inc. v. Amalgamated Shipping Corp., No. 87-1777, 1989 WL 79743 (E.D. 
Pa. July 17, 1989). A silver lining of this notorious voyage was that it galvanized international efforts to 
begin regulating the global disposal of hazardous waste. See, e.g., Sejal Choksi, The Basel Convention 
on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and Their Disposal: 1999 Protocol 
on Liability and Compensation, 28 ECOLOGY L.Q. 509, 515 (2001). 
184. 437 U.S. 617 (1978). 
185. Id. at 625 (quoting 1973 N.J. Laws, ch. 363, § 2 (codified as amended at N.J. STAT. ANN. § 
13:1I-10 (West Supp. 1978))).  
186. Id. (quoting 1973 N.J. Laws, ch. 363, § 1).  
187. The traditional state prerogative to protect public health and safety formed the basis of Justice 
Rehnquist's dissenting opinion. See infra note 214 and accompanying text; see also supra note 181. 
188. Philadelphia, 437 U.S. at 625 (describing New Jersey Supreme Court opinion). 
189. Id. at 626 (“This dispute about ultimate legislative purpose need not be resolved, because its 
resolution would not be relevant to the constitutional issue to be decided in this case.”). 











legislative means as well as legislative ends.”190 The Court held the legisla-
tion discriminatory on its face. It fell subject to a “virtually per se rule of 
invalidity” applied to cases of “simple economic protectionism.”191 Finding 
solid waste to be an “object” of “interstate trade,”192 the Court struck down 
the state’s attempt to “isolate itself in the stream of interstate commerce 
from a problem shared by all.”193 The Court forced New Jersey to accept 
Philadelphia’s waste into its landfills. 
Having committed to this course in Philadelphia, the Court followed the 
path dependence of stare decisis to extend its holding in various directions 
in future cases, including:  
• overturning attempts by state governments to restrict 
hazardous waste,194  
• striking down attempts by local governments to restrict out-of-
state waste,195  
• voiding differential taxes and charges for out-of-state waste 
disposal,196 and  
• upsetting a flow-control statute for waste disposal covering a 
local area when private business firms were involved.197  
In all of these cases, the states struggled, in the absence of preemptive 
congressional action, to address environmental waste problems within the 
constraints of the Court’s constitutional commodification. 
Finally, almost thirty years after Philadelphia, in United Haulers 
Association v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Management Authority,198 the 
Court upheld a local government flow-control scheme that involved only 
“facilities owned and operated by a state-created public benefit corporation” 
 
190. Id. 
191. Id. at 624. It is quite possible that the New Jersey legislature had “mixed motives,” including 
(1) environmental protection of its land and (2) economic protection of its local industries and 
municipalities who needed landfill space. See Andrew Verstein, The Jurisprudence of Mixed Motives, 
127 YALE L.J. 1106 (2018). However, it was duplicitous for the Court to reject both the New Jersey 
legislature’s and its highest court’s findings of at least a “primary motive” of environmental protection. 
Cf. id. at 1134–36 (examining areas of law using “primary motive” as a standard). Essentially, the Court 
assumed an illicit motive of economic protectionism without bothering to find any evidence for it. See 
id. at 1164 (“The law often avoids consideration of motives, and this impulse is even stronger when 
motives are mixed.”). 
192. Philadelphia, 437 U.S. at 622. 
193. Id. at 629. 
194. Chem. Waste Mgmt., Inc. v. Hunt, 504 U.S. 334 (1992). 
195. Fort Gratiot Sanitary Landfill, Inc. v. Mich. Dep’t of Nat. Res., 504 U.S. 353 (1992). 
196. Or. Waste Sys., Inc. v. Dep’t of Envtl. Quality, 511 U.S. 93 (1994).  
197. C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383 (1994).  












rather than a private business firm.199 At last, a constitutional work-around 
had been found to the Court’s interventions. 
This work-around is rickety, however, and uncertainties remain in other 
environmental contexts. Interstate disposal of hazardous waste from 
fracking operations has become an issue, and a question has arisen about 
whether Ohio, for example, may restrict or prohibit transportation of 
fracking waste from Pennsylvania.200 In a back-to-the-future moment, New 
Jersey’s governor in 2014 vetoed a bipartisan bill banning disposal of out-
of-state fracking waste, including from high-fracking Pennsylvania.201 It has 
also been suggested that fracking bans enacted by states such as Maryland, 
New York, and Vermont might be challenged under the negative Commerce 
Clause, given an alleged interference in allowing landowners to participate 
in the interstate commerce of oil and gas production.202 
Fresh water scarcity, which is likely to be exacerbated by climate 
disruption, will provoke questions about whether states may protect their 
water resources from commercialization and export.203 A challenge based 
on the Philadelphia line of cases may argue that “water” is, like “waste,” an 
“article of commerce.”204 The Court appears divided as well on whether 
 
199. Id. at 334. 
200. See Eric Michel, Note, Discrimination in the Marcellus Shale: The Dormant Commerce 
Clause and Hydraulic Fracturing Waste Disposal, 88 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 213, 235–43 (2012) (arguing 
that a proposed bill in Ohio provided for a two-tiered charge for in-state and out-of-state fracking waste 
would be unconstitutional).  
201. Times of Trenton Editorial Bd., Editorial: Gov. Christie's Veto of Fracking Waste Ban Is 
Toxic for N.J., TIMES TRENTON (Aug. 12, 2014), https://www.nj.com/opinion/index.ssf/2014/08/edit 
orial_gov_christies_veto_of_fracking_waste_ban_is_toxic_for_nj.html [https://perma.cc/MN5E-KJD 
2].  
202. See Alfred R. Light, Fracturing Moratoria Under the Dormant Commerce Clause: The Need 
to Shape Rather than Resist the Shale Gale, 44 ENVTL. L. REP. 10035, 10035–36, 10040–42 (2014); Jon 
Hurdle, With Governor’s Signature, Maryland Becomes Third State to Ban Fracking, NPR: 
STATEIMPACT PA. (Apr. 4, 2017, 9:35 PM), https://stateimpact.npr.org/pennsylvania/2017/04/04/with-
governors-signature-maryland-becomes-third-state-to-ban-fracking/ [https://perma.cc/WT8X-5KAZ]. 
This challenge to state fracking bans strikes us as unlikely, but it’s true that if oil and gas are 
characterized as a nascent “commercial good” or “item of commerce” in a manner similar to the 
mistaken treatment of waste and garbage in the Philadelphia line of cases, then there is some possibility 
of success.  
For an argument that a number of practical and political reasons support at least a “narrow” scope 
of federal regulation of fracking involving its potential air and water pollution, see David B. Spence, 
Federalism, Regulatory Lags, and the Political Economy of Energy Production, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 431, 
460–68, 506–08 (2013).  
203. See, e.g., Sebastien Malo, US Faces Fresh Water Shortages Due to Climate Change, 
Research Says, WORLD ECON. F. (Mar. 4, 2019), https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2019/03/us-faces-fr 
esh-water-shortages-due-to-climate-change-research-says [https://perma.cc/W5ZT-SXVT] (reviewing 
scientific studies that predict severe water shortages likely to be caused by climate shifts in the United 
States, particularly in western and midwestern states). 
204. E.g., Fort Gratiot Sanitary Landfill, Inc. v. Mich. Dep’t of Nat. Res., 504 U.S. 353, 359 (1992) 
(“Solid waste, even if it has no value, is an article of commerce.”); see Christine A. Klein, The Dormant 
Commerce Clause and Water Export: Toward a New Analytical Paradigm, 35 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 
 











states may restrict commerce in live bait to protect native fish and fisheries, 
a conflict which may extend to other biological resources and species 
preservation measures.205  
The Court’s treatment of waste in the Philadelphia line of cases presents 
an example of constitutional commodification. Relying on the negative 
Commerce Clause,206 the Court conceived of waste as a commodity, and 
treated trafficking in it as subject to the commercial market norms we have 
identified: consumerism, insofar as the Court refused to acknowledge that 
waste, or its disposal, might implicate anything of non-instrumental value; 
and atomism, insofar as the Court focused only on the transaction between 
the party that wanted to dispose of its waste and the party that would provide 
the disposal, without regard for the way many such transactions in the 
aggregate could implicate others’ interests.207 Further, the Court implicitly 
embraced unregulated commercial markets as the proper way to treat waste. 
Justice Stevens’s majority opinion in Fort Gratiot Sanitary Landfill, Inc. v. 
Michigan Department of Natural Resources208 made plain the Court’s 
 
131 (2011) (arguing against treating water as an article of commerce and suggesting various alternative 
frameworks).  
In one case, the Court struck down a state law restricting the interstate use of water resources on 
dormant Commerce Clause grounds. Sporhase v. Nebraska, 458 U.S. 941, 960 (1982). Justice Rehnquist 
dissented, writing that in his view “a State may so regulate a natural resource as to preclude that resource 
from attaining the status of an ‘article of commerce’ for the purposes of the negative impact of the 
Commerce Clause.” Id. at 963 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). But see Tarrant Reg’l Water Dist. v. 
Herrmann, 569 U.S. 614, 639–40 (2013) (upholding a state compact that prohibited export of water 
against a dormant Commerce Clause challenge). Future cases will likely turn in part on whether courts 
consider water to be a commercial commodity or a natural resource. Klein, supra note 204, at 147.  
205. Compare Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 338 (1979) (striking down a statute forbidding 
the export of minnows), with Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 151–52 (1986) (upholding a statute 
prohibiting baitfish importation in order to protect natural resources in wildlife). 
206. See supra note 180. For an early leading case (again in Philadelphia) establishing the 
“dormant” or negative power of the Commerce Clause, see Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 53 U.S. (12 
How.) 299 (1851). The roots of negative Commerce Clause jurisprudence trace to Chief Justice 
Marshall's decision in Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824); see FELIX FRANKFURTER, THE 
COMMERCE CLAUSE UNDER MARSHALL, TANEY, AND WAITE 15–19, 23–25 (1937). Ironically in this 
context, the metaphor of the “dormant” Commerce Clause first appeared in an opinion by Marshall that 
upheld the constitutionality of a state statute allowing the damming of a navigable stream. Willson v. 
Black Bird Creek Marsh Co., 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 245, 252 (1829). A litigant had described the stream as 
“one of those sluggish reptile streams, that do not run but creep, and which, wherever it passes, spreads 
its venom, and destroys the health of all those who inhabit its marshes.” Id. at 249. 
At present, the so-called “dormant” Commerce Clause is hardly passive and certainly not sleeping, 
so it is more accurate to refer instead to the “negative” Commerce Clause. This usage recognizes that 
reference to the “dormant” is a “bastardization” of Chief Justice Marshall's original use of the word. 
Julian N. Eule, Laying the Dormant Commerce Clause to Rest, 91 YALE L.J. 425, 425 n.1 (1982). It also 
makes clear that “what remains dormant is Congress, and not the commerce clause” and follows the 
suggestion that “[t]he clause's limitation on state regulation can certainly be termed implicit, silent, or 
negative, but dormancy does not accurately describe the situation.” Id.; see also Or. Waste Sys., Inc. v. 
Dep’t of Envtl. Quality, 511 U.S. 93, 95, 98–99, 108 (1994) (referring to the “negative Commerce 
Clause”). 
207. See supra Part I.B.1.  












insistence that the market is the only place for waste: “Solid waste, even if 
it has no value, is an article of commerce.”209 The Court in these cases has 
ignored the collective good of a clean and safe natural environment.  
To see that the Court was not inexorably led to commodify waste, 
consider three other ways to conceive of the problem of waste disposal: first, 
as analogous to quarantine laws, which had traditionally been taken to be 
exceptions to the negative Commerce Clause; second, and relatedly, as an 
environmental problem with waste figuring as a source of pollution; and 
third, as implicating land use and as such a problem of land preservation 
rather than commerce. Chief Justice Rehnquist, who dissented in each of 
the Court’s forays into this area during his time on the Court, advanced 
arguments giving voice to each of these objections.210 On any of these three 
alternative arguments, the relationship between waste disposal and 
collective interests is made plain: public health, the preservation of the 
natural environment against pollution, and the conservation of land. All of 
these are collective goods.211  
 
209. Id. at 359. 
210. In historical order, see City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 630–32 (1978) 
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (arguing that “health and safety” considerations supported New Jersey’s right 
to regulate solid waste disposal and likening New Jersey’s protective legislation to quarantine laws); 
Fort Gratiot, 504 U.S. at 368, 373 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (arguing that the waste regulation was 
“at least arguably directed to legitimate local concerns, rather than improper economic protectionism,” 
and finding “no reason in the Commerce Clause . . . that requires cheap-land States to become the waste 
repositories for their brethren, thereby suffering the many risks that such sites present”); Chemical Waste 
Management, Inc. v. Hunt, 504 U.S. 334, 349 (1992) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (“States may take 
actions legitimately directed at the preservation of the State’s natural resources, even if those actions 
incidentally work to disadvantage some out-of-state waste generators. . . . Taxes are a recognized and 
effective means for discouraging the consumption of scarce commodities—in this case the safe 
environment that attends appropriate disposal of hazardous wastes.”); Oregon Waste Systems, Inc. v. 
Department of Environmental Quality of Oregon, 511 U.S. at 108, 110, 112 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) 
(“The State of Oregon responsibly attempted to address its solid waste disposal problem through 
enactment of a comprehensive regulatory scheme for the management, disposal, reduction, and recycling 
of solid waste. For this Oregon should be applauded. . . . [T]he Court stubbornly refuses to acknowledge 
that a clean and healthy environment, unthreatened by the improper disposal of solid waste, is the 
commodity really at issue in cases such as these. . . . [S]olid waste . . . is not a commodity sold in the 
marketplace; rather it is disposed of at a cost to the State.” (citations omitted)).  
211. The Court’s previous quarantine cases are particularly noteworthy because they had upheld 
a state government’s authority to restrict interstate trade or transportation to protect public health. A 
number of these cases involved state restrictions on diseased or uninspected cattle or sheep. See, e.g., 
Mintz v. Baldwin, 289 U.S. 346 (1933); Asbell v. Kansas, 209 U.S. 251 (1908); Rasmussen v. Idaho, 
181 U.S. 198 (1901). State authority in this area is now preempted by federal statutes giving the 
Department of Agriculture regulatory authority to control trade in livestock. See, e.g., Texarkana 
Livestock Comm’n v. USDA, 613 F. Supp. 271 (E.D. Tex. 1985) (resolving dispute regarding cattle 
disease regulation). Similarly, states had authority to regulate interstate commerce in fruit for the same 
reason, namely, prevention of disease. See, e.g., Sligh v. Kirkwood, 237 U.S. 52 (1915). Federal 
regulation has also preempted this area of quarantine regulation. See, e.g., Or.-Wash. R.R. & Navigation 
Co. v. Washington, 270 U.S. 87 (1926) (federal preemption of state regulation to prevent migration of 
weevil-infected hay). 
The Court could easily have followed the same course with respect to waste disposal. It could have 
 











In our review of the campaign finance cases above, we showed that even 
if political speech was not degraded in any single economic transaction, 
spending on political speech as a whole implicated the collective good of 
democratic self-government, and so warranted treatment different from 
what the commercial market offers.212 A similar insight follows when one 
considers waste disposal in the aggregate. Waste is not a good whose value 
is corroded when it is subject to commercial exchange. If anything, waste 
has negative value—it is better conceived of as a “bad” rather than a “good,” 
or a byproduct of commerce rather than commerce itself.213 Waste itself 
undergoes no degradation where one party pays to have it transferred to 
another. It has already been designated as “waste”! Waste disposal in the 
aggregate, however, threatens degradation of the natural environment and 
in many cases human health as well. Just as the collective good of self-
government militates in favor of restrictions on the amount of political 
speech one can pay to disseminate, so the collective good of environmental 
protection argues in favor of restrictions on the amount of waste landfill 
 
upheld state authority to regulate interstate commerce in waste which, like diseased livestock and fruit, 
can have consequences for public health. Cf. Blair P. Bremberg & David C. Short, The Quarantine 
Exception to the Dormant Commerce Power Doctrine Revisited: The Importance of Proofs in Solid 
Waste Management Cases, 21 N.M. L. REV. 63, 70–77, 82 (1990) (arguing that states in some cases 
failed to present sufficient factual evidence of risks to public health to justify regulation). 
212. See supra Part II. 
213. There are exceptions when using “waste” as new “inputs” for manufacturing or other 
alternative use, such as in contemporary schemes to promote a “circular economy” in which “waste” is 
instead reprocessed, reused, or recycled into products or services rather than disposed of or otherwise 
discarded. For an overview including applications in different business sectors, see CATHERINE 
WEETMAN, A CIRCULAR ECONOMY HANDBOOK FOR BUSINESS AND SUPPLY CHAINS: REPAIR, REMAKE, 
REDESIGN, RETHINK (2017); see also The Circular Economy: Regulatory and Commercial Law 
Implications, 46 ENVTL. L. REP. 11009 (2016) (panel discussion); FELIX PRESTON, CHATHAM HOUSE, 
A GLOBAL REDESIGN? SHAPING THE CIRCULAR ECONOMY (2012), https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/25a 
2/445d773e16a37bcb9f69dc34065aa8604a88.pdf?_ga=2.52224425.1248396345.1565974621-139545 
3234.1565974621 [https://perma.cc/VAH7-G7VJ]; FELIX PRESTON & JOHANNA LEHNE, CHATHAM 
HOUSE, A WIDER CIRCLE? THE CIRCULAR ECONOMY IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES (2017), https://www 
.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/publications/research/2017-12-05-circular-economy-preston-lehn 
e-final.pdf [https://perma.cc/B7JD-DHEL]. For an early conceptual analysis along similar lines, see 
WILLIAM MCDONOUGH & MICHAEL BRAUNGART, CRADLE TO CRADLE: REMAKING THE WAY WE 
MAKE THINGS (2002). For an extension advocating design in order to improve natural environmental 
background conditions, see WILLIAM MCDONOUGH & MICHAEL BRAUNGART, THE UPCYCLE: BEYOND 
SUSTAINABILITY—DESIGNING FOR ABUNDANCE (2013). 
Note also that a regulatory approach for a circular economy aims specifically at encouraging the 
design of manufacturing, distribution, service, supply, and other economic relationships as not treating 
waste as a commodity to be disposed of or discarded but rather as new resources that circulate as 
standard economic commodities that have positive or at least neutral value. The European Union has 
enacted the first systemic approach for moving toward a circular economy vision. See generally Report 
on the Implementation of a Circular Economy Action Plan, COM (2017) 33 final (Jan. 26, 2017), http://e 
c.europa.eu/environment/circular-economy/implementation_report.pdf [https://perma.cc/6N2G-K9W 
U]; see also Rafael Leal-Arcas, Sustainability, Common Concern, and Public Goods, 49 GEO. WASH. 
INT’L L. REV. 801, 874–75 (2017) (noting that the “concept of a circular economy is also an opportunity 













operators may accept or other regulations designed to reduce the production 
of waste or to channel its disposal, recycling, and reuse.214  
There is a second way in which the Court’s commodification of waste is 
like its commodification of political speech. Recall in the campaign finance 
cases that the Court insisted, without any empirical support, that the First 
Amendment’s aim of having the most diverse speech reach the greatest 
number of people necessarily ruled out restrictions on independent 
spending.215 In the waste cases decided under the negative Commerce 
Clause, the Court similarly presumes that striking down discriminatory state 
regulation of waste is necessary to ensure a national market for waste 
disposal, which it seems further to assume is likely to result in the least-cost 
solution to waste disposal problems.216  
Here too, the Court relies on an empirical premise that may prove false. 
The economic analysis of waste is not simple, and the Court’s assumptions 
are most likely wrong.217 In the long run, treating waste as a commodity to 
be freely traded and transported for least-cost disposal or reprocessing may 
not provide the most efficient outcome. Instead, increasing the cost of waste 
disposal may enhance efforts to decrease the total amount of waste—
encouraging efficient design of production processes, packaging redesign, 
and recycling programs.218 Moreover, different types of waste—hazardous 
waste, for example, as opposed to nonhazardous solid waste—may involve 
 
214. Cf. Philadelphia, 437 U.S. at 629–33 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (arguing that under the 
Court’s logic, New Jersey would have to let solid waste flood in from other states, as long as there was 
a private landfill willing to accept it, and suggesting that this outcome impermissibly trod on the state’s 
prerogative to protect the “health and safety” of its citizens). 
215. See supra Part II.A. 
216. See Philadelphia, 437 U.S. at 623–24 (focusing on the national economy as the relevant 
“unit” of legal analysis). 
217. See, e.g., Kirsten Engel, Reconsidering the National Market in Solid Waste: Trade-Offs in 
Equity, Efficiency, Environmental Protection, and State Autonomy, 73 N.C. L. REV. 1481 (1995) 
(contesting the idea that a “national free market in solid waste disposal” provides the most efficient 
economic solution, and proposing other solutions such as state compacts); Jason Scott Johnston, The 
Tragedy of Centralization: The Political Economics of American Natural Resource Federalism, 74 U. 
COLO. L. REV. 487 (2003) (providing an economic analysis casting doubt on the assumption that a 
national market in waste is more efficient than other solutions that may be advanced by state and local 
governments). But see William J. Cantrell, Cleaning Up the Mess: United Haulers, the Dormant 
Commerce Clause, and Transaction Costs Economics, 34 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 149, 150 (2009) (arguing 
for “judicial enforcement of the dormant Commerce Clause as a viable judicial option for economically 
efficient business regulation”). 
Economic approaches are also not unidimensional with respect to policy preferences. See David B. 
Spence & Paula Murray, The Law, Economics, and Politics of Federal Preemption Jurisprudence: A 
Quantitative Analysis, 87 CALIF. L. REV. 1125, 1194–95 (1999) (describing federal preemption and 
negative Commerce Clause cases as divided between judges who favor Coasian free-market solutions 
and judges who favor Pigovian regulation of externalities). 
218. See supra note 217; cf. David M. Driesen & Amy Sinden, The Missing Instrument: Dirty 
Input Limits, 33 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 65 (2009) (arguing for charges on “dirty inputs” at the front-end 
of manufacturing or distribution processes as another alternative). 











different economic and social considerations, which may in turn call for 
different regulatory approaches.219 
Our argument here is not that we oppose creative market-trading 
techniques that use legislative commodification as a policy tool. The advent 
of “environmental trading markets” has provided significant innovations in 
dealing with many environmental challenges, including: controlling acid 
rain, reducing overfishing, preserving endangered species, and addressing 
global climate change.220 We instead argue that the Supreme Court is not 
the appropriate branch of government to make these kinds of 
determinations. Environmental regulation is complex, relying on many 
different variables, and the Court is simply not in the best institutional 
position to decide how it should be done.221 
Given the possibility and even the likelihood that other regulations would 
better deal with the problem of environmental waste, the Court’s laissez-
faire approach is unwarranted. The Court’s lack of empirical support for its 
policy preference belies an implicit zeal for commercial markets that 
subsumes other considerations.222 In declaring waste to be an object of 
 
219. For example, environmental justice regarding racial and other social factors is particularly 
salient when the distribution of risks to health and safety are involved, such as is often the case with the 
location of hazardous waste disposal sites. See, e.g., Richard J. Lazarus, Pursuing “Environmental 
Justice”: The Distributional Effects of Environmental Protection, 87 NW. U. L. REV. 787, 801–06 
(1993); see also Sheila Foster, Justice from the Ground Up: Distributive Inequities, Grassroots 
Resistance, and the Transformative Politics of the Environmental Justice Movement, 86 CALIF. L. REV. 
775, 775 (1998) (providing a case study of “predominantly poor, African-American residents of Chester, 
Pennsylvania who attempted to stop the clustering of waste facilities in their community”). 
220. See James Salzman & J.B. Ruhl, Currencies and the Commodification of Environmental 
Law, 53 STAN. L. REV. 607 (2000) (describing these methods and finding that they often require different 
“currencies” other than money to accomplish effectively); see also Sarah E. Light, The Law of the 
Corporation as Environmental Law, 71 STAN. L. REV. 137, 152 (2019) (describing a historical 
“transition away from ‘command-and-control’ regulation, a somewhat pejorative term for prescriptive 
rules, to market-leveraging approaches that employ price- or quantity-based mechanisms to force 
polluters to internalize the costs of their environmental externalities and thus reduce pollution more 
efficiently”); Sarah E. Light & Eric W. Orts, Parallels in Public and Private Environmental Governance, 
5 MICH. J. ENVTL. & ADMIN. L. 1, 13 tbl.1 (2015) (offering a taxonomy of different tools of 
environmental regulation, including emissions trading markets and market-leveraging strategies, for 
both public law and private governance). 
221. See Paul R. Kleindorfer & Eric W. Orts, Informational Regulation of Environmental Risks, 
18 RISK ANALYSIS 155 (1998) (recommending that legislative policy-making should begin with the 
“problem context” and then investigate a number of different regulatory strategies to find the best and 
most politically viable solution).  
222. A zeal for economic markets does not always translate into good economics. Justices of the 
Supreme Court do not seem particularly well qualified either personally or institutionally to make 
economic policy, and this is another reason that questions of environmental commodification should be 
left to legislators who may, unlike courts, consult qualified economists as part of the policy-making 
process. Cf. Saul Levmore, Judges and Economics: Normative, Positive, and Experimental Perspectives, 
21 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 129, 129–30 (1997) (“One struggles to express anything but mixed feelings 
about the normative use of law and economics in judicial decisionmaking. When judges are wise, when 













commerce, the Court effectively commodifies parts of the natural 
environment. It licenses an atomistic and consumerist approach to waste 
disposal notwithstanding the fact that a commercial market in waste may 
threaten to undermine the collective good of environmental protection.223 
Nothing in the Constitution or previous precedents required the Court to 
commodify waste in Philadelphia and its successors. Another case decided 
about a decade later expressed a better view because it deferred to the 
wisdom of the state legislature when acting to preserve the environment.224 
In Maine v. Taylor,225 the Court said: “The Commerce Clause significantly 
limits the ability of States and localities to regulate or otherwise burden the 
flow of interstate commerce, but it does not elevate free trade above all other 
values.”226 The collective good of preservation of the natural environment 
is one of those values.227 
B. The Constitutionalization of Waste 
Like the Court’s treatment of money and political speech, its 
jurisprudential treatment of waste disposal exemplifies the other side of the 
coin of constitutional commodification as well. As we have seen, the 
counterpart of commodification by constitutional implication is the 
constitutionalization of a commodity, whereby the Court confers upon a 
commodity the kind of protection from regulation that traditional 
constitutional values receive.228 In its waste disposal cases, the Court 
overturns regulations in part because it treats waste itself as worthy of 
constitutional protection.  
Of course, one might contend that any time the Court invalidates a 
regulation on negative Commerce Clause grounds it is constitutionalizing 
 
might control other decisionmakers, they are tempted to set the world right. . . . The arguments against 
the normative application of law and economics scarcely need rehashing here. Much of economics is 
built on questionable assumptions. Its very design is influenced by the positive character of most social 
science. It accepts a good deal as exogenously given, when law has the power to change much of the 
status quo. And the list goes on and on.”). 
223. Cf. M. Neil Browne et al., The Struggle for the Self in Environmental Law: The Conversation 
Between Economists and Environmentalists, 18 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 335, 337 n.8 (2001) 
(arguing against atomism “because so many arguments on behalf of environmental regulation presume 
that an appeal to community is an appeal to the connective tissue that links one human to another, one 
generation to another, and one species to another. The resulting holism is referencing an entity that 
transcends society as just a collection of individual egos.”).  
224. See F. Italia Patti, Judicial Deference and Political Power in Fourteenth Amendment and 
Dormant Commerce Clause Cases, 56 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 221, 222–23, 246 (2019) (arguing that the 
Court should defer more readily to state legislatures in negative Commerce Clause cases than some 
others because a political remedy is usually available via federal legislation). 
225. 477 U.S. 131 (1986). 
226. Id. at 151–52 (upholding state statute to protect its own wildlife).  
227. Id.  
228. See supra text accompanying notes 18–22. 











commodities—protecting them from regulation through the Constitution. 
What is different and problematic in the Philadelphia line of cases is that 
waste is not obviously, and not even plausibly, a true commodity, and 
whatever commodity may be at stake is constitutionalized at the unjustified 
expense of a collective good.229 
Consider first that to characterize waste as a commodity is to conceive 
of it as a good that is bought and sold. But waste disposal does not really 
involve the buying and selling of waste. The landfill operator does not pay 
for the use or ownership of the waste itself, but is instead paid to take and 
dispose of the waste. Justice Rehnquist argued as much,230 and he was right. 
To say “waste is a good” doesn’t make sense. The Court accomplished the 
commodification of human detritus, but to no clear end or purpose. 
Conceivably, the relevant commodity is not waste, but the service of 
disposing of it. Indeed, the Court moved in just this direction in C & A 
Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown.231 Perhaps recognizing that the 
conclusory characterization of “waste” as “an article of commerce” had 
already begun to wear thin,232 Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion explained 
that “what makes garbage a profitable business is not its own worth but the 
fact that its possessor must pay to get rid of it.”233 “In other words,” he 
continued, “the article of commerce is not so much the solid waste itself, 
but rather the service of processing and disposing of it.”234  
 
229. See supra text accompanying note 213 (suggesting waste is more appropriately described as 
a “bad” with a negative cost rather than a good with a positive value). Again, note that the Court’s 
manner of proceeding in commodifying waste and reviewing regulation of it under the negative 
Commerce Clause is quite different from legislative approaches that use commodification as a legislative 
tool to address a particular environmental problem. In legislative commodification, a market-based 
solution, such as a pollution credit trading regime, is established within a policy framework by which 
different regulatory features are selected as useful, effective, and efficient. See supra note 220 and 
accompanying text. The problem in constitutional commodification is that the Court is making an 
implicit policy decision about how to treat the environmental problem of waste without either an 
empirical foundation or a broad consideration of alternative approaches. 
230. E.g., Fort Gratiot Sanitary Landfill, Inc. v. Mich. Dep’t of Nat. Res., 504 U.S. 353, 369 n.1 
(1992) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). 
231. 511 U.S. 383 (1994). 
232. See supra notes 204, 210 and accompanying text. 
233. Carbone, 511 U.S. at 390–91. 
234. Id. at 391. To consider the cases as “services” of waste disposal rather than transactions in 
waste as “goods” weakens the negative Commerce Clause analysis because the focus shifts to the 
“disposal” within a state rather than the transportation of what is to be “disposed of” from outside of the 
state. This is essentially the “interpretative out” that the Court developed for itself in United Haulers: 
exempting states from negative Commerce Clause peril when they provide a public service in waste 
disposal. See United Haulers Ass’n v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth., 550 U.S. 330, 334 
(2007) (“The only salient difference [between United Haulers and Carbone] is that the laws at issue here 
require haulers to bring waste to facilities owned and operated by a state-created public benefit 
corporation. We find this difference constitutionally significant.”). 
Note that this solution is antithetical to the idea that the private provision of services may often 













Thinking of waste disposal as a “service” certainly seems more 
accurately descriptive than thinking of waste as a “good,” but the best 
characterization is that neither waste nor its disposal is a commodity at all. 
One may instead view the waste problem from the perspective of its site of 
disposal. From this perspective, waste is usually disposed in landfills or 
incinerated. To the extent that landfills and incinerators threaten to harm the 
environment (e.g., through hazardous leakage or toxic rain), waste is from 
this perspective a form of pollution. Landfill space is scarce, dumping 
pollutes the land, incineration pollutes the air, and both methods of disposal 
can put water supplies at risk.235 It therefore seems perfectly reasonable to 
conceive of laws regulating the quantities, processing, or cost of waste 
disposal as aiming at environmental protection. Traditionally, state 
regulation of the environment had been respected as within the state’s 
traditional powers and authority in the absence of congressional 
preemption.236 In its negative Commerce Clause waste cases, the Court 
mistakenly—and in an activist mode—departed from this tradition.237 
In retrospect, Justice Worrall Mountain of the New Jersey Supreme 
Court had the better argument. He argued that “commodities or substances 
injurious to the public health are not ‘articles of commerce’ within the 
meaning of the constitutional phrase.”238 “Their lack of market value,” he 
continued, “coupled with their immediate threat to human health dictates 
that such substances not be afforded the protection of the Commerce 
Clause.”239 He emphasized New Jersey’s interest in “the preservation of the 
environment and the protection of ecological values.”240 In support, he 
quoted an old but still relevant case in which Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes 
 
therefore has the unintended consequence of requiring a government solution to the problem rather than 
allowing for regulatory flexibility to include private operators.  
235. For examples of these toxic tradeoffs in the context of power plants in Pennsylvania and 
elsewhere, see Charles Duhigg, Cleansing the Air at the Expense of Waterways, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 13, 
2009, at A1.  
236. See, e.g., Robert V. Percival, Environmental Federalism: Historical Roots and 
Contemporary Models, 54 MD. L. REV. 1141, 1172 (1995) (“Despite the growth of federal 
environmental law, Congress has gone to great lengths to preserve an important role for the states in 
environmental policy-making. State law retains considerable importance in the environmental protection 
arena. Congress generally has been careful not to preempt state law except in narrow circumstances.”); 
see also supra note 181 and accompanying text. 
237. For an argument that, since 1976, just a few years before its decision in City of Philadelphia 
v. New Jersey, the Court has become more activist with respect to pro-development decisions in 
environmental cases and has relied increasingly on policy arguments based on economic efficiency 
rather than other values, see Richard E. Levy & Robert L. Glicksman, Judicial Activism and Restraint 
in the Supreme Court’s Environmental Law Decisions, 42 VAND. L. REV. 343 (1989). 
238. Hackensack Meadowlands Dev. Comm’n v. Mun. Sanitary Landfill Auth., 348 A.2d 505, 
513 (N.J. 1975), vacated and remanded sub nom. City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 430 U.S. 141 
(1977) (per curiam). 
239. Id. 
240. Id. at 516. 











insisted on his version of the collective good of the natural environment: 
“[T]he state has an interest independent of and behind the titles of its 
citizens, in all the earth and air within its domain. It has the last word as to 
whether its mountains shall be stripped of their forests and its inhabitants 
shall breathe pure air.”241  
The U.S. Supreme Court went wrong in these cases because it 
characterized waste as a commodity, or waste disposal as a service, and then 
applied the machinery of the negative Commerce Clause to strike down 
state regulation.242 If the Court had characterized waste as pollution rather 
than a commercial commodity, it would have been more likely to come to 
the right result. By instead constitutionalizing waste as a commodity, the 
Court extended greater protection to waste than to the environment that the 
waste threatens. In doing so, the Court undermined the ability of state 
legislatures to protect the collective good of the natural environment.243 
Again, to be clear, we do not mean to say that legislative approaches that 
employ market-based regulatory methods to address environmental 
problems are suspect. It is perfectly legitimate and acceptable, in our view, 
for state legislatures or Congress (or even private actors) to create new 
markets for waste disposal, especially when doing so serves environmental 
ends such as waste minimization or elimination. We support the legislative 
commodification of waste so long as it is protective of the collective good 
of the natural environment.244 
The problem is that the Court in its “waste is commerce” cases has 
overstepped the bounds of its institutional competence and eroded the 
authority of state legislatures. The Court should tread more carefully in the 
likely event that these kinds of cases will arise in the future, such as in 
efforts by states to protect themselves from such environmental challenges 
 
241. Id. at 518–19 (quoting Georgia v. Tenn. Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230, 237 (1907)).  
242. Note also that the exception allowed so far by the Court in United Haulers appears to be a 
relatively narrow one. The Court emphasized that the case turned on the fact that the flow-control 
management system relied on a public-owned facility. United Haulers Ass’n v. Oneida–Herkimer Solid 
Waste Mgmt. Auth., 550 U.S. 330, 334, 339–45 (2007). Presumably, private waste disposal businesses 
will continue to have causes of action against discriminatory treatment in other contexts. But see id. at 
349 (Thomas, J., concurring) (arguing that he would “discard the Court's negative [or dormant] 
Commerce Clause jurisprudence” entirely). 
243. A former prosecutor in Pennsylvania pointed out an interesting connection between our two 
case studies as demonstrated in a criminal case against a state representative who was involved in 
organizing illegal campaign contributions to a U.S. senator in order to stop federal waste regulation that 
would have allowed states to restrict interstate disposals. See United States v. Serafini, 7 F. Supp. 2d 
529 (M.D. Pa. 1998), aff’d, 167 F.3d 812 (3d Cir. 1999). This case illustrates that constitutional 
commodification in one area (campaign finance) may have feedback loops that encourage 
commodification in another (environmental protection), and vice versa. 












as fracking waste, depredation of water resources, and the transformation of 
energy production and distribution.245 
CONCLUSION: PROTECTING COLLECTIVE GOODS FROM THE COURT 
We began by positing that collective goods exist, and they include 
institutions such as our democratic government as well as the environmental 
endowments of land, air, water, and atmosphere that support our lives and 
those of future generations. These collective goods are worth protecting.246 
We posited further that the long-term social and economic dynamic 
known as commodification can threaten collective goods.247 Democratic 
government is a collective good in the sense that mutual participation of all 
citizens on at least a relatively equal basis defines it.248 To the extent that 
our government is or becomes bought and paid for by its wealthiest citizens, 
 
245. See supra notes 200–205 and accompanying text (fracking and water issues); Alexandra B. 
Klass & Jim Rossi, Revitalizing Dormant Commerce Clause Review for Interstate Coordination, 100 
MINN. L. REV. 129 (2015) (energy law and policy).  
Renewable energy portfolio standards are one kind of effective climate regulation strategy that may 
prove vulnerable to a negative Commerce Clause challenge. See Felix Mormann, Constitutional 
Challenges and Regulatory Opportunities for State Climate Policy Innovation, 41 HARV. ENVTL. L. 
REV. 189, 193–94, 200–09 (2017). If “energy” in broad terms is considered “in commerce,” then state 
regulation that discriminates with respect to the environmental characteristics of the source (e.g., solar 
or wind instead of coal or oil) may be vulnerable to a constitutional commodification argument. In partial 
response to this constitutional threat, several scholars have argued for reform of negative Commerce 
Clause jurisprudence. See, e.g., Michael Barsa & David A. Dana, A Climate Change Lens on the 
Dormant Commerce Clause, Lifecycle GHG Taxes, and In-State RPSS Requirements, 5 SAN DIEGO J. 
CLIMATE & ENERGY L. 69 (2014); Kirsten H. Engel, The Dormant Commerce Clause Threat to Market-
Based Environmental Regulation: The Case of Electricity Deregulation, 26 ECOLOGY L.Q. 243 (1999); 
Danny Englese, Note, Tilting at Windmills: Finding an Alternative Dormant Commerce Clause 
Framework to Preserve Renewable Portfolio Standard Generator Location Requirements, 47 ARIZ. ST. 
L.J. 983 (2015); Daniel K. Lee & Timothy P. Duane, Putting the Dormant Commerce Clause Back to 
Sleep: Adapting the Doctrine to Support State Renewable Portfolio Standards, 43 ENVTL. L. 295 (2013). 
For earlier arguments for the Court to restrict the scope of review under the negative Commerce Clause, 
see Eule, supra note 206; Catherine Gage O’Grady, Targeting State Protectionism Instead of Interstate 
Discrimination Under the Dormant Commerce Clause, 34 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 571, 576 (1997). 
A different kind of challenge involves contests among the states for access to water, especially in 
rivers, lakes, and groundwater. The Supreme Court has decided three cases of disputes between states 
over water, and it currently has on its docket an interesting claim in Mississippi v. Tennessee, in which 
the state of Mississippi claims to “own” all of the groundwater located within state lines as against use 
or capture by another state. Mississippi v. Tennessee, 136 S. Ct. 499 (2015) (referring case to a special 
master); see Christine A. Klein, Owning Groundwater: The Example of Mississippi v. Tennessee, 35 
VA. ENVTL. L.J. 474, 479–81 (2017). The Court prefers that states negotiate agreements about water use 
that are then approved by Congress, but the difficulty and the stakes involved in these disputes are likely 
to increase given predictions of future water scarcity. Id. at 477; see also supra note 203 and 
accompanying text.  
246. See supra Introduction & Part I.B. 
247. See supra Part I.A. 
248. See, e.g., ROBERT A. DAHL, ON DEMOCRACY 37–40 (Ian Shapiro ed., 2d ed. 2015) 
(emphasizing the importance of equal and effective participation in democracy); see also HASEN, supra 
note 115, at 188 (arguing that “the one-person, one-vote rule should carry over to money-in-politics 
decisions,” leading to the imposition of “reasonable limits on money in elections”). 











it becomes a plutocracy rather than a collective project of self-
government.249 In this way, democratic self-government is inconsistent with 
its commodification.250 
Many environmental collective goods also survive only if they are not 
reduced to commodities. In addition to our opening example of national 
parks,251 we examined the problem of the creation and disposal of waste.252 
Consider also the natural gifts of potable water and breathable, healthy air. 
Consider the wealth of biodiversity that human processes of economic 
commodification now threaten to destroy.253 Consider the atmosphere—the 
thermostat of our planet that has now been seriously disrupted due to the 
massive scale of commodified economic activities of production, 
distribution, and consumption of goods and services.254 Land, water, air, and 
atmosphere are all collective goods worth protecting. 
In this Article, we have focused on the tensions that can arise between 
collective goods and expanding commercial commodification. To preserve 
collective goods such as democracy and a healthy environment we must 
look to the processes of government as well as markets. Only with 
government—and not entirely unrestrained commercial markets—can we 
properly manage the existential perils to the collective goods of humanity.  
More specifically, we must place our faith and efforts in national, state, 
and local legislatures255—and in law. Again, this does not mean that 
economic markets cannot be usefully channeled, or new regulatory markets 
created, to address the challenges of collective goods. Markets to preserve 
 
249. In Lincoln’s lofty words, we seek a “government of the people, by the people, for the people.” 
Abraham Lincoln, Gettysburg Address (Nov. 19, 1863), in ROY P. BASLER, ABRAHAM LINCOLN: HIS 
SPEECHES AND WRITINGS 734, 734 (1946); see also HASEN, supra note 115, at 5, 9 (emphasizing “the 
fundamental unfairness of a political system moving toward plutocracy” and recommending reforms “as 
a means of promoting and preserving political equality”). 
250. See supra Part II. 
251. See supra text accompanying note 1; cf. JOSEPH L. SAX, MOUNTAINS WITHOUT HANDRAILS: 
REFLECTIONS ON THE NATIONAL PARKS (1980) (reflecting on the varied purposes and values involved 
in national parks, including the preservation of wilderness and a sense of awe). 
252. See supra Part III. 
253. According to a recent assessment by the United Nations, synthesizing thousands of scientific 
reports, one million species of plants and animals face extinction in the next few decades owing to 
expanding human activities. Jeff Tollefson, Humans Are Driving One Million Species To Extinction, 
NATURE (May 6, 2019), https://www.nature.com/articles/d41586-019-01448-4 [https://perma.cc/W634-
ZDMA]; see also ELIZABETH KOLBERT, THE SIXTH EXTINCTION: AN UNNATURAL HISTORY (2014) 
(summarizing evidence that we are living through the sixth era of mass extinctions of species on Earth 
in geological time). 
254. See JAMES GUSTAVE SPETH, THE BRIDGE AT THE EDGE OF THE WORLD: CAPITALISM, THE 
ENVIRONMENT, AND CROSSING FROM CRISIS TO SUSTAINABILITY 17–45 (2008) (surveying eight main 
global environmental dangers). On the threat to our climate in particular, see generally BILL MCKIBBEN, 
FALTER: HAS THE HUMAN GAME BEGUN TO PLAY ITSELF OUT? (2019); WILLIAM NORDHAUS, THE 
CLIMATE CASINO: RISK, UNCERTAINTY, AND ECONOMICS FOR A WARMING WORLD (2015); DAVID W. 
ORR, DOWN TO THE WIRE: CONFRONTING CLIMATE COLLAPSE (2009); DAVID WALLACE-WELLS, THE 
UNINHABITABLE EARTH: LIFE AFTER WARMING (2019).  












collective goods, though, must serve these ends, and not the unmoored, 
often self-interested aims of individuals transacting in commercial 
markets.256 
Thus our target for criticism here has not been government in general, 
but only one of its branches—the Supreme Court—and only a discrete but 
important set of cases that it decides. The Court, we have argued, has tended 
to take a narrow view of these larger problems of collective goods. Its 
docket is driven by petitions from interested parties, many of them business 
firms or others seeking immediate economic advantage.257 In this posture, 
the Court should defer, when possible, to congressional, state, and local 
legislation.258 It should seek to empower rather than to hobble the modern 
democratic processes of government.  
One primary lesson we draw from the jurisprudence of “money is 
speech” and “waste is commerce” is to plead with the Court to restrain 
itself.259 When asked to overturn a legislative effort to protect a collective 
good, the Court should attend to whether its reasoning would unduly elevate 
a commodity or degrade a collective good. In other words, the Court should 
resist solutions that rely on methods of constitutional commodification.260  
A minimal response to our plea for judicial modesty would be for the 
Court to be assiduous in considering the views of third-party advocacy 
 
256. See supra note 220 and accompanying text. This is not to say that business and nonprofit 
organizations do not have a significant role to play in solving collective goods problems, but we believe 
that government plays an essential role in guiding society toward finding and following solutions to 
collective goods problems. No evidence supports the arguments associated with Ayn Rand and her 
extreme libertarian followers such as the Koch brothers that wholly unrestricted business and 
individualist interests can preserve collective goods such as democratic government and an 
environmentally livable planet. See MCKIBBEN, supra note 254, at 90–130 (critiquing “[t]he cult of Ayn 
Rand” that has captured many of “the rich and powerful” in our society). 
257. See supra note 14 and accompanying text. According to one comprehensive study, the 
current Court has been relatively favorable toward business interests. The study found that “a plunge in 
warmth toward business during the 1960s (the heyday of the Warren Court)” has been “quickly 
reversed,” and “the Roberts Court is much friendlier to business than either the Burger or Rehnquist 
Courts, which preceded it, were.” Lee Epstein, William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, How Business 
Fares in the Supreme Court, 97 MINN. L. REV. 1431, 1472 (2013). 
258. See supra Parts II & III. We imagine that it is possible for a future Court to embrace an active 
defense of collective goods, but because of the adversarial context of judicial decisions and the 
institutional difficulty for judges to consider empirical evidence bearing on collective goods and their 
preservation, this kind of judicial shift seems unlikely. 
259. See Michael J. Gerhardt, Constitutional Humility, 76 U. CIN. L. REV. 23 (2007); 
Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of John G. Roberts, Jr. to Be Chief Justice of the United States: 
Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 55 (2005) (statement of John G. Roberts, 
Jr., Nominee, Chief Justice of the United States) (emphasizing the importance of deciding cases with 
humility and on the narrowest possible grounds); see also LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE 
THEMSELVES: POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM AND JUDICIAL REVIEW (2004); LAWRENCE G. SAGER, 
JUSTICE IN PLAINCLOTHES: A THEORY OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL PRACTICE (2004); Marc 
Spindelman, Toward a Progressive Perspective on Justice Ginsburg's Constitution, 70 OHIO ST. 
L.J. 1115, 1126 (2009). 
260. See supra Part I.C. 











groups concerned about the protection of collective goods (e.g., Common 
Cause, Fair Fight, the Nature Conservancy, the Sierra Club, and other 
nonprofit organizations). Governments acting through their executives at 
the federal, state, and local levels also have reason to take collective goods 
seriously. In addition to taking on the role of litigants themselves, 
governments can often alert the Court, as intervenors or amici curiae, to 
facts and legal arguments that expose threats or harm to collective goods 
beyond the immediate focus of competing litigants.  
More substantively, the Court should consider retreating from its activist 
use of judicial review in collective goods cases. It could, for example, revive 
and reinvigorate principles that defer to the elected, representative branches 
of government, such as the political question doctrine261 and the “clear 
mistake” standard of review.262 
Many more cases implicating collective goods, and not only in the areas 
of constitutional democracy and the natural environment, will come to the 
Court going forward. For example, we believe that our account can offer an 
illuminating perspective on National Federation of Independent Business v. 
Sebelius and subsequent efforts to challenge the Affordable Care Act’s 
individual mandate.263 The collective good of national health is an essential 
interest that threatens to be overlooked in these recurring cases.  
We believe that our account can also illuminate troubling dynamics in 
other disparate areas of law, including the Court’s protection of commercial 
speech, union dues, trademarks for offensive speech, and gun ownership.264 
 
261. See, e.g., Louis Henkin, Is There a “Political Question” Doctrine?, 85 YALE L.J. 597, 599 
(1976) (“[A] political question is one in which the courts forego their unique and paramount function of 
judicial review of constitutionality.”); J. Peter Mulhern, In Defense of the Political Question Doctrine, 
137 U. PA. L. REV. 97, 101 (1988) (arguing against “judicial monopoly” of constitutional questions). 
262. RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., LAW AND LEGITIMACY IN THE SUPREME COURT 160 (2018) 
(noting that under “the rule of clear mistake” the Court “would presume that legislators had found the 
legislation that they enacted to be constitutionally permissible and would hold such legislation 
unconstitutional only if the legislature had made a ‘clear mistake’ in constitutional reasoning”); James 
B. Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of Constitutional Law, 7 HARV. L. REV. 129, 
144 (1893) (original version of the rule). 
263. 567 U.S. 519 (2012). Having found that the individual mandate violated the Commerce 
Clause, the Court nonetheless upheld it as a “tax” under Congress’s taxing and spending authority. Id. 
at 574. As of this writing, a new case challenging the constitutionality of the Affordable Care Act is 
being heard by the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals. See Li Zhou, The Latest Legal Challenge to the 
Affordable Care Act, Explained, VOX, https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2019/7/9/20686224/aff 
ordable-care-act-constitutional-lawsuit-fifth-circuit-court-texas-district-court [https://perma.cc/9D7E-
MDAJ] (last updated July 10, 2019). 
264. We leave elaboration of these applications for another day, but here are several brief 
suggestions. 
(1) Commercial speech might be reasonably limited to freedom to provide information for the 
collective good of efficient business and consumer markets. Cf. Robert Post, The Constitutional Status 
of Commercial Speech, 48 UCLA L. REV. 1, 11 (2000) (“[C]ommercial speech should receive 













Our theory of collective goods and constitutional commodification thus 
offers a unique and probing lens into many developing areas of law where 
commerce and the Constitution coincide and sometimes conflict. 
It remains to be determined how exactly courts, or the law more 
generally, should respond when collective goods are at stake. Here we 
venture opinions only in a preliminary manner, setting forth possibilities for  
further thought and development in the future. 
One approach to protecting collective goods would rely on new 
legislation at all levels of government. In some cases, legislative 
prohibitions or bans might be appropriate, such as the prohibition imposed 
on the killing, taking, or trading of endangered species,265 or the federal ban 
on the bribery of public officials.266 In this connection also, we celebrate 
and support experiments in what we have called legislative 
commodification.267 Unlike constitutional commodification, legislative 
approaches are democratically adopted rather than imposed by an unelected 
Court. Indeed we already see proposals of this kind in the areas of our two 
main case studies. Bills to provide public funding or individual matching 
funds to moderate the influence of money in political elections seem 
promising.268 Creative market-based or market-leveraging approaches 
aimed at environmental protection may also prove attractive.269  
 
in a democratic society.’” (quoting 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 512 (1996) 
(Stevens, J., plurality opinion))).  
(2) Requiring union dues does not seem to implicate the First Amendment, contra Janus v. 
AFSCME, 138 S. Ct. 2448, 2478 (2018), given that the union speaks for the collective good of employees 
whether or not they pay dues. See Amy J. Sepinwall, Free Speech and Off-Label Rights, 54 GA. L. REV. 
(forthcoming 2020). 
(3) The Court might overturn or limit its decision in Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744 (2017), which 
extended trademark protection to ethnic slurs, because that decision could lead to government approval 
of hateful or racist trademarks for groups such as the Ku Klux Klan or neo-Nazis that aim to undermine 
the collective goods of mutual tolerance and a commitment to democratic government.  
(4) A collective good of public safety and “domestic tranquility” could be invoked to cabin the 
expansion of an excessively and dangerously individualized view of gun ownership rights under the 
Second Amendment. See Danielle Allen, Opinion, What Is Domestic Tranquility? It Is Not Being 
Gunned Down in Your House of Worship, WASH. POST (Oct. 28, 2018, 11:22 AM), https://beta.washingt 
onpost.com/opinions/what-is-domestic-tranquility-it-is-not-being-gunned-down-in-your-house-of-wors 
hip/2018/10/28/599749fe-dab6-11e8-b3f0-62607289efee_story.html [https://perma.cc/TU8Q-8APL] 
(“Achieving domestic tranquility is a constitutional issue. It is a moral issue. It is a matter of what, 
without discrimination in regard to our social identities, we all owe one another.”).  
265. See supra note 68 and accompanying text. 
266. See, e.g., Ofer Raban, Constitutionalizing Corruption: Citizens United, Its Conceptions of 
Political Corruption, and the Implications for Judicial Elections Campaigns, 46 U.S.F. L. REV. 359, 
368–72 (2011) (describing scope of federal bribery statute). 
267. See supra text accompanying note 220. 
268. See, e.g., ACKERMAN & AYRES, supra note 108; LESSIG, supra note 95, at 264–75. 
269. See supra note 229 and accompanying text. 











Legislative solutions are not likely to be sufficient, though, for legislators 
may face traps of potential capture,270 majoritarian tyranny,271 and loops of 
political control arising from the very campaign finance problems that we 
have identified.272 Also as seen in our two principal case studies, both 
federal and state legislative solutions can run into constitutional trouble.273 
A form of higher lawmaking should therefore buttress quotidian democratic 
approaches. By higher lawmaking we mean the evolution of the larger 
constitutional system toward the recognition and protection of collective 
goods such as democracy and the natural environment.274  
In the last several decades, scholars have produced exciting work 
identifying new mechanisms for higher lawmaking.275 By design, these 
efforts sacrifice the deep entrenchment that a formal constitutional 
amendment secures.276 Yet we believe that the natural environment and 
democratic government deserve the utmost protection. We therefore 
recommend formal constitutional amendments to protect these collective 
goods.  
 
270. See, e.g., JANE MAYER, DARK MONEY (2016). 
271. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, at 23 (James Madison) (Richard Beeman ed., 2012) 
(expressing concern for “the violence of [majority] faction”).  
272. See, e.g., Sanford Levinson, Electoral Regulation: Some Comments, 18 HOFSTRA L. REV. 
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Nor are we alone. Others have proposed amendments to protect public 
rights in the environment,277 to encourage equal political participation,278 
and to restrain the role of money in politics.279 We commend these efforts, 
but none of them specifically concerns itself with collective goods. In future 
work, we anticipate offering our own set of amendments and perhaps other 
proposals to address the particular ills that our two case studies have 
illuminated. 
More broadly speaking, our theory of collective goods and constitutional 
commodification makes plain the ways in which the Court has recently 
become overly enamored of commercial markets, using the Constitution 
both to extend their scope inappropriately and to protect expanded exchange 
from regulation. The Court has used the Constitution to commodify non-
commodities, subjecting them to market norms that degrade them in the 
aggregate. It has constitutionalized commodities, extending constitutional 
protection to them in a manner usually reserved for our most cherished 
constitutional rights.280 Unchecked, constitutional commodification risks 
undermining many important collective goods in which we all share. 
Jurists, scholars, and commentators concerned with these developments 
have often sought to argue against them on the basis of the individual rights 
and interests that they implicate. This strategy, however, pits one set of 
individual interests against another (e.g., the individual right to speak as 
much as one would like on political matters versus the individual right to be 
heard).281 Or it sets one group of individual interests against the interests of 
a state, where the former are taken to be presumptively weightier than the 
latter (e.g., the right of a private landfill owner to acquire and dispose of an 
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unlimited amount of waste versus the right of a state to regulate the kind 
and quantity of waste it allows to be transported and disposed).282  
These legal contests are far more lopsided than their adversarial posture 
may lead us to believe. On one side, there is an individual litigant who 
complains of a violated right. On the other stands the interests of all of us 
who share in the collective good that the litigation threatens. As stewards of 
these collective goods, we should identify where and how they are 
threatened, and we should find and establish methods to protect them from 
erosion through further constitutional commodification. 
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